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INTRODUCTION

The Rehnquist Court's federalism doctrine and the domestic implementation of human rights obligations can coexist in harmony. This is
not a timid suggestion. American federalism and the human rights implementation discourse do not share a visible common ground. Each
theme can be polarizing. Each triggers passionate debate about classic
conceptual tensions.' Each embodies political ideologies, though discussions for the most part treat these subjects as non-ideological. For
instance, commentators disagree on the value of judicial federalism as an
abstract matter and as a structural arrangement,3 debate the merits of judicial restraint versus judicial intervention vis-A-vis the power of
Congress to legislate,4 dispute the importance of cultural relevance in
relation to human rights norms, argue about the political orientation of
the underlying debate,5 and generally find little to agree upon.
1.
For a thoughtful examination of the tensions and norms that have developed around
the role of the Rehnquist judiciary as both policy-makers and decision-makers, see Judith
Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and FederalPower, 78
IND. L.J. 223 (2003). For an essay reflecting on some of the points of tension, see Ann
Althouse, A Response to Professor Woolhandler's "Treaties, Self-Execution, and the Public
Law Litigation Model", 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 789, 794 (2002).
2.
See Makau Wa Mutua, Politics and Human Rights: An Essential Symbiosis, in THE
ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND IN-

LAW 149 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); see also Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus
Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 48-49 (2003); R. Randall
Kelso, A Post-Conference Reflection on Federalism,Toleration,and Human Rights, 40 S. TEx.
L. REV. 811 (1999) (asserting that commentators' views about federalism are often driven by
TERNATIONAL

partisan political calculations).

3.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Conservative Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (citing to the divergent interpretations of the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine).
4.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1092 (2001); Peter M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal":
What's Right and Wrong With Conservative JudicialActivism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201 (2000);
Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139
(2002).
5.
See Mutua, supra note 2, at 149; see also Curtis Bradley, The Costs of International
Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 457 (2001); Frank B. Cross, The Relevance of
Law in Human Rights Protection, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (1999); Jack Goldsmith,
Should InternationalHuman Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 327
(2000); Michael J. Perry, Prtecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the
Courts?, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (2003); Dinah Shelton, ProtectingHuman Rights in a
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This Article explores whether the Rehnquist Court's federalism doctrine, as elaborated during this last decade, should or ought to extend to
the domestication of discrete provisions of ratified human rights treaties.
It explores this question by examining the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and by considering the civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as potential
implementing legislation for the equality provisions of the Covenant. In
the context of this inquiry, the discussion engages federalism, as developed by the current Court, on its own terms. That is, I do not seek here to
defend it or reject it. It seeks to refocus the broader debate to the specific
context of the VAWA and the ICCPR.
Similarly, this Article openly assumes the normative value of complying with human rights norms, and supports the extant understanding
that the political safeguards of federalism is a substantive and significant
limitation. In other words, what follows proposes a framework where the
domestication of human rights provisions through the treaty power is
consistent with the structural allocation of powers set out in the Constitu6
tion.
The federalism doctrine of 1920 posed no judicially enforceable limits
on Congress's power to implement treaties. Justice Holmes, in Missouri v.
Holland,7 announced that the "invisible radiations" emanating from the
Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 273 (2002); Beth Stephens, Taking Pride
in InternationalHuman Rights Litigation,2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 485 (2001); Mark Tushnet, Federalism and InternationalHuman Rights in the New ConstitutionalOrder, 47 WAYNE L. REV.
841 (2001).
6.
I refer here to the distribution of powers between the states, the federal government,
and the judiciary. The federalism doctrine of the Rehnquist Court has been justified as much
by the structural guarantees of the Constitution-reserving to the states an unquantifiable
quantum of power not delegated to the federal government-as it has by the specific provisions
of the Constitution and the Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments. It seems reasonable
to posit that executive and congressional powers in the realm of treaty making merit more
judicial deference than in other areas, such as those addressed by the Court in its federalism
cases. Just as "context matters" in affirmative action programs in higher education, as found in
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003), perhaps, too, context matters or ought to. matter in foreign affairs. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism,70 U. COLO. L. REv.
1223, 1223 (1999) (suggesting that the context of foreign relations law necessitates that it be
treated differently from other domestic legal regimes); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n. v. Garamendi,
539 U.S. 2374 (2003) (striking down California's Holocaust Victims Insurance Act as preempted by the foreign affairs doctrine). Justice Souter stated several well worn principles in
Garamendi:"There is, of course, no question that at some point an exercise of state power that
touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government's policy .
I...
Id. at 2386.
"Nor is there any question generally that there is executive authority to decide what that policy
should be." Id. "[V]alid executive agreements are fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are
Id. .....
at 2387. In a footnote, the opinion limited the preemptive power of treaties to the
Constitution's guarantee of individual rights and explained that it should be exercised in subordination to the Constitution's applicable provisions, citing Justice Sutherland in United
States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). Id. at 2387 n.9.
7.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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Tenth Amendment did not curb a plenary treaty power exercised through
implementing legislation, even if Congress lacked the power to enact the
same statute under Article 1.8 Justice Holmes's analysis has been, and
remains today, settled constitutional law since 1920. But because the
case's holding seemed so broad, many feared that Holland cleared the
path for a dangerously expansive use of the treaty power. This apprehension centered on the potential encroachment into state interests that
would result from the domestication of human rights norms, which could
negatively affect state interests. 9 The specter of forced international
compliance with international human rights treaties provoked a strident
political campaign to overrule or narrow Holland's reach.' These attempts failed, and eighty years later, Holland" remains an explicit
Supreme Court endorsement of Congress's power to domesticate international agreements.'2 Justice Holmes tethered this holding to the caveat
that whatever qualifications exist to the treaty-making power, they must
be found somewhere other than in the Tenth Amendment. 3 The Holland
caveat raises important questions about the proper scope of the treaty
power in the presence of a vigorous state-rights doctrinal presumption.
Constitutional life was simpler in 1920, and the domestic implications of international law relatively undemanding. But the breathtaking
developments of the last 80 years have altered the political, historical,
and constitutional assumptions that prevailed at the time of Holland.
Global interdependence, the emergence of human rights norms as binding international obligations, proliferation of treaties, an expanded
8.
Id. at 433-35.
9.
See infra, notes 10, 31, 256 and accompanying text on the controversies generated
by the Bricker Amendment.
10.
See, e.g., DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 40 (1988); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). In the
1950's Senator John Bricker took the initiative to propose an amendment to the Constitution
to "make certain that no treaty or executive agreement will be effective to deny or abridge
[American people's] fundamental rights." Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman,
Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker
Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 313 (1988). Bricker hoped that the amendment would
counter the effect of Holland and similar cases which in his view rendered the Tenth Amendment a dead letter. Id. at 315-16. Section 2 of the proposed amendment stated: "No treaty
shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international organization to supervise,
control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States within the United States enumerated in this constitution or any other matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States." Id. at 315. In exchange for tabling the amendment, the Eisenhower administration agreed not to ratify the Genocide Convention. Id. at 320.
11.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
12.
For a thorough discussion of Holland and the statute involved, see infra, notes 30423 and accompanying text.
13.
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. For ease of reference, I will refer to this proposition as
the Holland caveat.
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concept of the Nation-state, and a transformation in domestic and international institutions, all combine to call into question the continuing
validity of Justice Holmes's declaration. Whether these changes should
alter the proposition that the Tenth Amendment does not limit implementing legislation is a question that needs exploring. The Supreme
Court has never addressed the Holland caveat, and some commentators
argue that because of the significant structural implications of judicial
the Court may choose not to face it in the foreseeable fuinvolvement,
14
15
ture, or ever.
A reconsideration of Holland's holding would be constructive not
only because of transformations in the international landscape, but also
because the sweeping and institution-altering changes the Rehnquist
Court has made to the allocation of power between Congress and the
states,16 some argue, may (or should) lead to the narrowing or overruling
of Holland.7
The Rehnquist Court, with its distinctive brand of "first principles"
federalism doctrine, has expertly embossed significant new constitutional limits on congressional legislative powers.'8 The "invisible
See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Missouri v. Holland: Beside the Point?, 94 AM. Soc'y
14.
INT'L L. PRoc. 140-141 (2000); Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty
Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403 (2003); see also Althouse, supra note 1, at 790-94.
This would require treating the question as non-justiciable. See Chicago & S. Air
15.
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (holding that foreign policy
matters are not within the judiciary's competence); see also American Insurance Assn. v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 2374, 2386-87 (2003). Though a preemption case, the Court explicitly
reaffirmed the power of the President to conduct foreign relations. Garamendi strongly suggests that the Court would be more inclined to consider validity of a treaty a non-justiciable
matter than to intervene.
16.
Some commentators however view the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions in a
less transforming way. For example, Professor Vicki Jackson proposes that the changes federalism has created, though significant, are really part of a constitutional dialogue that has
existed all along. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative ConstitutionalExperience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 223-233 (2001).
17.
See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 395 (1998) [hereinafter Federalism /]; Curtis Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, Part 11, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Federalism 11] (responding to Professor Golove's Article, Historical Foundations, infra this note); Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalismto U.S. Foreign Relations,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998);John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, NonSelf-Execution, and the Original Understanding,99 COLUM. L REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter
Globalism and the Constitution]. For a thoughtful response to Professor Bradley and an extensive exploration of the history of the treaty power, see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and
the Nation. The Historical Foundationsof the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1083 (2000) [hereinafter Historical Foundations].
18.
The Rehnquist Court has used the term "first principles" to describe a government
structure in which there ought to exist meaningful limits to national power in a system in
which the states occupy a semi-sovereign role. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 55253 (1995). Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, referred to the following "first principles" as guiding the decision:
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radiations" of the Tenth Amendment have taken on a very visible form in
the Court's jurisprudence. These can be identified as: (1) Tenth Amendment prohibitions on Congress's ability to commandeer the legislative or
executive processes of the states;'9 (2) Eleventh Amendment and structural limitations on Congress's power to create private causes of action
against the states; ° (3) Fourteenth Amendment limitations on Congress's
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See Art. I,
§ 8. As James Madison wrote: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution
to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
state governments are numerous and indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292293 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of authority
"was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties."
Gregory v. Aschcrof, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the states and the Federal Government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."
Id. I use the term "first principles federalism" as shorthand for the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions that have changed dramatically the balance of power between Congress and the
Federal Courts. This jurisprudence resulted in the cropping of congressional power in a number of spheres - most notably under the Commerce Clause and under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For a more thorough analysis of this point, see Ana Maria MericoStephens, Of Maine's Sovereignty, Alden's Federalism, and the Myth of Absolute Principles,
33 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 325, 329-330 (2000) (describing first principles federalism as "mystical categorical federalism"); Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, United States v. Morrison and the
Emperor'sNew Clothes, 27 J.C. & U.L. 735 (2001) (exploring the institutional implications of
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
19.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down portions of the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act because it commandeered local enforcement officers
to carry out federal policy); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down
the Take-Title provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act on the
ground that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress from commandeering state legislatures
to enact federal compliance policies, even if the Commerce Clause permitted the enactment of
the Act itself).
20.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (striking down a portion
of the Indian Game Regulatory Act on the grounds that the Eleventh Amendment limited Article I powers and prevented Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity to create
private causes of action in federal court); Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene, 521 U.S. 261 (1997) (dismissing an injunctive relief action against Idaho on Eleventh Amendment grounds); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (applying Seminole to hold that Congress is prohibited from abrogating state sovereign immunity in state courts); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000) (striking down a portion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as violating the
Eleventh Amendment and being beyond the scope of Congress's power under Section Five of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that a federal law that abrogated state sovereign immunity for patent
infringement claims violated the Eleventh Amendment and was beyond Congress's powers
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to create new property rights); Coll. Savings
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding unconstitutional the abrogation of states' sovereign
immunity to create private causes of action under the American with Disabilities Act as exceeding Congress's Section Five, Fourteenth Amendment powers); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C.
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ability to enact remedial legislation pursuant to Section Five;" and
(4) Commerce Clause limitations on the scope of Congress's power to
regulate subjects that are not exclusively economic and that interfere
with state prerogatives."
These considerable restrictions have energized the dialogue about
what is the nature of American government.2 ' The context of the debate
is whether any of the limitations identified above should also limit the
treaty making power. Commentators have written prolifically about this
question, arguing that the treaty power ought to be similarly limited,2
that it is not (or should not be) limited at all,25 that it is only conditionally
limited,26 or that the question is beside the point. Most agree, however,
that the question is an important one that merits exploring. The
State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (holding that Congress lacks the power to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity for private causes of action brought in Article I tribunals); Nevada
v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (upholding congressional abrogation of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, used as the
source of power for enacting the Family Medical leave Act). Hibbs is the first in this line of
cases to uphold congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity. It is also the first case to
meet the strict "congruence and proportionality" test established by City of Boeme v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507 (1997). See infra, note 21.
21.
In addition to the cases cited supra, notes 19-20, see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at
598 (holding unconstitutional the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act
as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment remedial powers);
Flores, 521 U.S. at 507 (holding unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 as exceeding Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
22.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549 (striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act as exceeding the permissible scope of the commerce power); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607-19.
23.
By an American form of government, I mean descriptively to capture the notion that
in a government of limited and enumerated powers, where the states exist within a sphere of
doctrinally created sovereignty prerogatives, what the federal government can do is limited not
so much by any explicit provision of the Constitution, as it is by the structure of government
itself.
24.
See Federalism1, supra note 17.
25.
See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to Be a Nation?: FederalPower vs. "states' Rights"
in ForeignAffairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1296-97 (1999); Historical Foundations,supra
note 17; Stephens, supra note 16; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14
CONST. COMMENTARY 33, 46 (1997) [hereinafter Global Dimension]; Gerald L. Neuman, The
Nationalizationof Civil Liberties, Revisited 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1645-47 (1999) [hereinafter Civil Liberties]; Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
371 (1997) [hereinafter Sense and Nonsense]; Jordan Paust, Customary InternationalLaw and
Human Rights Treaties Are the Law of the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301 (1999)
[hereinafter Customary InternationalLaw]; Jordan Paust, Human Rights Purposes of the Violence Against Women Act and InternationalLaw's Enhancement of CongressionalPower, 22
Hous. J. INT'L L. 209 (2000) [hereinafter VAWA].
26.
See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment, 42 VA. J. INT'L
L. 713 (2002) (suggesting that the treaty power is limited by Eleventh Amendment doctrine);
Swaine, supra note 14 (proposing a "treaty-compact" device to address federalism constraints
on the treaty power).
27.
See Spiro, supra note 14, at 140, 141.
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contributions are impressive and perhaps reflect the importance of
sorting out the implications of doctrinal cross-fertilization. Whether
federalism limitations, in the form and with the presumptions of the
doctrine described above, alter the nation's ability to comply with
international obligations.
What these discussions reveal is that federalism, as an underdeveloped doctrine, offers little guidance to the unresolved question of the
Holland caveat. Some scholars, in the process of dusting off reflections
from eras past, as well as revisiting our post-ratification political and
doctrinal history,28 advocate limitations to Congress's exercise of the
treaty power that seem oddly anachronistic and disconnected from the
implications of their own theories. By this last comment I mean to suggest that theorizing about what modem doctrinal limits, if any, ought to
be in place to restrain potential abuses of the treaty power, is an unsatisfactory analysis of the problem. The implications of imposing federalism
limits on treaty makers are significant and should be factored into the
theory. The merger of doctrine, theory, and a changed global landscape
renders these theories incomplete.
Concerned with a potentially boundless power, commentators invoke
the neo-federalism of the Rehnquist Court as evidence that the most legitimate29 reading of the Constitution ought to incorporate the structural
concerns expressed by the Court.30 They propose new, provocative,

28.
POWER

See

EDWARD

291 (1913);

S. CORWIN,

NATIONAL

TANANBAUM, supra

SUPREMACY:

TREATY

POWER VS.

STATE

note 10; Charles H. Burr, The Treaty-Making Power

of the United States and the Methods of its Enforcement as Affecting the Police Powers of the
states, 51 PROC. Am. PHIL. Soc'Y 270, 339-356 (1912) (explaining case law invalidating state
laws inconsistent with assumed treaty obligations); George A. Finch, The Need to Restrain the
Treaty-Making Power of the United States within ConstitutionalLimits, 48 AM. J. INT'L L.
577 (1954); William E. Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the Presidentand
the Senate of the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 528 (1909); Quincy Wright, The Constitutionality of Treaties, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 256 n.51 (1919) (setting forth a
comprehensive list of commentators who advocated the supremacy of the treaty power over
state power).
29.
I use the term "legitimate" here to describe not the theoretical or doctrinal legitimacy of first principles federalism, but only to suggest that what the majority of the Rehnquist
Court has held is a legitimate interpretation of the Constitution is the measure by which the
arguments must be constrained.
30.
Scholars explain treaty limitations in normative terms rather than based on a descriptive, originalist, authoritative understanding of the Constitution. This desire of what ought
to be rather than what is may fairly be described as revisionist. I do not critique the revisionist
nature of the dialogue, for my own view is revisionist. Revisionism, by its very nature, opens
up the normative debate to a whole spectrum of perspectives, none of which can claim superiority to an authoritative view of what ought to be. However, if a claim is made to alter the
status quo, the heavier burden ought to lie on those claiming settled understandings ought to
be altered.
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though ultimately normative approaches to this ageless debate. 3' First
principles federalism, no doubt, provides the so-called "revisionists"
with enough fodder to construct a powerful argument that the treaty
power should not be exempted from federalism limitations as an abstract
matter.
This "treaty power exceptionalism" offensive on settled doctrine has
triggered powerful retorts. These responses, labeled as "nationalist" by
those who disagree, argue that the treaty power is not limited as suggested by revisionists, but rather that it operates as a plenary power as
confirmed by history and doctrine. Structural federalism restraints, these
scholars argue, are inconsistent with this conception, while political
safeguards have proven to be more robust than revisionists propose. 32 As
thoughtful and provoking as much of the literature is, one is left with a
sense that something is missing from the discourse. At the end of the
as Profesday, the Quixotic quest for an answer seems elusive. Perhaps,
' 33
loose.
remain
always
ends
"[1]oose
suggests,
sor Epstein
My modest contribution here recognizes as a starting point that
whether federalism limitations ought to apply to the treaty power is ultimately an interpretive and a normative preference. It seems unhelpful to
suggest structural arrangements that are dogmatic, or that fail to take into
account the practical consequences of the normative choice. The very
nature of the treaty power counsels that arguments relating to its scope
should bolster, rather than subsume, its role in maintaining principles of
international law. Its scope cannot be evaluated solely from the perspective of domestic constitutional law for it is not an internal power; it ought
to take into account the international context in which operates. 3' In the
31.
See Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and
Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically
Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979); Civil Liberties, supra note 25, at 1645-47; Customary
International Law, supra note 25; Federalism I, supra note 17, at 395; Federalism II, supra
note 17; Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1296-97; Global Dimension, supra note 25, at 46; Globalism and the Constitution, supra note 17; HistoricalFoundations,supra note 17, at 1083; Sense
and Nonsense, supra note 25; VAWA, supra note 25; Carlos Manuel Vizquez, Breard, Printz,
and the Treaty Power, 70 U. COLo. L. REV. 1317, 1343 (1999) [hereinafter Breard, Printz];
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2162 (1999) [hereinafter Treaties]; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Law Making: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self- Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2219 (1999) [hereinafter Treaties
and PublicLaw Making]; see also Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate
Concerning " Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
515, 530 (1991); Henkin, supra note 10; Tushnet, supra note 5.
32.
See, e.g., Historical Foundations, supra note 17, at 1083-86; Flaherty, supra note
25; see also supra notes 5, 25 and accompanying text.
33.
Richard A. Epstein, Smoothing The Boundary Between Foreign and Domestic Law:
Comments on Professors Dodge, Golove, and Stephan, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 663, 664 (2003).
34.
See Peter J. Spiro, Contextual Determinism and Foreign Relations Federalism, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 363, 363 (2001) [hereinafter Contextual Determinism]; see also Robert
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absence of an international law regime, the treaty power serves no purpose. Deliberations about its scope that eliminate this international
dimension from the discourse, or that only give a cursory reference to it,
are incomplete. For this power, if it is anything at all, it is the instrument
that facilitates the United States' participation in the global community.
This Article discusses the scope of the treaty power from a different
perspective than what has been offered. Whatever the virtuousness or
iniquitousness of first principles federalism, it offers very little to answer
the Holland caveat. I suggest here that the obligations that attach to international participation should be given some weight, and I offer a
concrete example of one such obligation, through which practical
framework one can test the principles here discussed. I consider whether
the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act
31
36
(VAWA),35 struck down in Morrison, could be reenacted as implementing legislation for the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant),37 and conclude that it could have. I have chosen
Morrison and the VAWA because together they highlight, in direct and
practical terms, the conflicts that arise from isolated considerations of
federalism theories.
Part I sets forth the recognition of gender-motivated violence as a
human rights concern. This discussion is followed by exploring the obligations the United States has assumed under the Covenant. Specifically,
it explores the equality and nondiscrimination provisions of the Covenant with respect to the United States' response to the international
community on the steps it has taken to implement these. In this context,
this Section discusses the international law of state responsibility and
considers whether these principles may require the United States to
adopt implementing legislation along the lines proposed in the VAWA.
This discussion is a helpful one even for those skeptical of the normative legitimacy of international human rights law as a pressure factor
on national power. My argument does not depend on accepting the value
of complying with human rights obligations for understanding the importance of their inclusion in an exchange of ideas with respect to the
Anderson IV, 'Ascertained in a Different Way': The Treaty Power at the Crossroadsof Contract, Compact, and Constitution, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189 (2001) (suggesting a
contractual understanding of the treaty power wherein contracting parties agree to the terms
without consideration of state interests); Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1999 (2003).
35.
Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1941-1942 (codified
as amended in scattered Sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter VAWA].
36.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
37.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, S. EXEc. Doc. No. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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scope of the treaty power. I acknowledge, however, that ultimately the
conversation stems from an interest in empowering the federal government to adopt these kinds of regimes because one favors them.
Part II explores the treaty power along historical, doctrinal, and theoretical dimensions. It discusses the historical understandings,
misunderstanding, and silences surrounding the adoption of the Treaty
Clause. It concludes that the framers understood the power of the United
States to enter into and enforce treaties to be complete and urgently
compelled by the failure of the Articles of the Confederation to force
states to comply with international obligations. The treaty power's outer
reach was not tethered to the federalism limitations advocated by some
scholars. The country's international obligations and the global expectations that arise with respect to these seem to be inseparable constituent
elements of a power designed to speak to these concerns.
The Article concludes with some thoughts on how one can conceptualize differently what role federalism can play in protecting the
structural guarantees with respect to proper allocations of power between
the states and the federal government. I suggest that doctrinal collisions
are neither self-evident nor compelled. Because the treaty power inherently involves this country's international commitments, and the capacity
or lack thereof to fulfill those, what the treaty power means today or
what the limitations to its application are, cannot be answered without
understanding what our international obligations have become and what
they demand.
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS,

VAWA,

AND IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION

A. The Recognition of Gender-MotivatedViolence and Sex
Discriminationas an InternationalHuman Rights Problem
1. Introduction
Human rights are a legitimate subject of international concern, and
how a state treats its citizens is no longer a matter within its exclusive
jurisdiction. The very concept of human rights is revolutionary because
it contradicts the notion of sovereignty. 39 But the atrocities perpetrated
during World War II brought about a fundamental change in how
nations' jealously guarded domestic domains ought to be conceived
under international law. Though state sovereignty remains, inherently,
38.

See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES at 144-45, introductory note (1987).
39.
See DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS

6 (2d ed. 1989).
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the organizing principle of an international legal regime, the human
rights discourse in customary and treaty law has pierced the sovereignty
shield. The modem dialogue explicitly contextualizes the state as an
instrument for advancing fundamental human
• • 41values rather than as one
possessing unchecked control over its citizens.
Although the United Nations Charter recognized the global imperative of "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women, 4 2 traditional deliberations about human rights developed largely without
considering the impact upon women.43 Only recently has equality been
accepted as an issue that international law ought to address."
The formal journey formally to recognize equality as a fundamental
right has not been a sprint along an undemanding road. Recognizing
gender-motivated violence as a transgression of a fundamental human
right in particular, has not been intuitive, self-developing, or inherently
accepted. Indeed, as late as 1990, women's rights issues were on the
margin of the human rights agenda. The serious problem of violence
against women was not addressed officially until much later.
Historically, violence against women was considered (and many
continue to consider it) a matter of purely local or private concern. 6 This
translates into the state not assuming a role or responsibility to address
40.
See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 39
(2000). Professor Anaya explains that the norms and principles of international law, including
of course its procedures, remain largely a product of the state sovereignty rhetoric. This reality
is the result of the very nature of the international legal system whose legitimacy still depends
on and is shaped by the constitutive theory of statehood. "In practical terms, recognition by a
preponderance of actors on the international plane remains crucial to a state's capacity to
invoke or benefit from the principles and procedures of international law." Id. at 40; see also
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty", Josd E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and
its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 393, 394-95 (2000) (explaining that "sovereignty remains
the single most important international institution in existence"); Keynote Address in Sibley
Lecture (March 1994), in 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 31, 33-35 (1995/1996) [hereinafter
Sibley Lecture].
41.
See ANAYA, supra note 40, at 40 (explaining that the modern dialogue about human
rights has taken on the form of classic era naturalism, focusing on what law ought to be rather
than on what it is).

42.

U.N.

CHARTER

pmbl.

43.
See Felipe Gomez Isa, The Optional Protocolfor the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women: Strengthening the Protection Mechanisms of
Women's Human Rights, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 291, 294 (2003).
44.
See Henkin, supra note 40, at 60.
45.
See Rhonda Copelon, International Human Rights Dimensions of Intimate Violence: Another Strand in the Dialectic of Feminist Lawmaking, I1 Am.U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 865, 866 (2003).
46.
See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 40, at 1119; Judith Resnik, Feminist Justice, at Home
and Abroad: Reconstructing Equality: of Justice, Justicia,and the Gender of Jurisdiction, 14
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM, 393, 398-399 (2002) [hereinafter Reconstructing Equality]; see also
infra, notes 97-159, and accompanying text discussing the private/public distinctions.
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the problems inherent in this societal construction. Against this backdrop, it is nothing short of remarkable that women have been able to
achieve the significant victories they have secured at the international
level, and if only briefly, at the national level through the VAWA.47
Credit belongs at least in part to a burgeoning international feminist
movement that has enriched, strengthened, and propelled the evolution
of human rights norms and their codification. Of the many human
rights causes that have been championed during the past decade,
women's groups have attempted to place the human rights of women at
the center of the discourse. Supporters of women's issues have worked at
the local, national, and international levels to raise awareness about the
problems of gender inequality and to create remedial schemes that adopt
equality as their driving force. 49 They have pressed indefatigably to bring
gender-motivated violence to the attention of the international community. °
The 1993 Vienna Conference on human rights is considered a
defining moment for women's rights,' specifically with regards to
violence against women. Participants successfully lobbied for, and
obtained the first official recognition that violence against women ought
to be addressed as a human rights problem.52 This recognition launched a
process of placing women's rights and gender equality at the forefront of
47.
See Reconstructing Equality, supra note 46, at 398 (pointing out that obtaining the
national consensus for the passage of VAWA was difficult, the process lengthy, and it survived
only for a short time).
48.
See Copelon, supra note 45, at 866.
49.
See Barbara Stark, Domestic Violence and International Law: Good-Bye Earl
(Hans, Pedro, Gen, Chou, Etc.), 47 LOYOLA L. REV. 255, 264 (2001) (describing the central
role women's issues took in developing the human rights agenda). For example, the Women's
Rights Project of Americas Watch on violence against women in Brazil has brought international attention to the problem of wife-murder in Brazil. Hilary Charlesworth, What are
"Women's International Human Rights"?, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58, 72 (Rebecca Cook ed., 1994) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
OF WOMEN] (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN IN BRAZIL, AN AMERICAS WATCH REPORT (1991)). Americas Watch found that Brazil
was responsible under international law because of the pattern of discriminatory state response
to domestic violence. Id. at 72-73; see also Catharine MacKinnon, Are Women Human?, in
REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY ANTHOLOGY 17 (Barend Van Der Heijden & Bahia Tahzib-Lie, eds., 1998); Celina
Romany, State Responsibility Goes Private:A Feminist Critique of the Public/PrivateDistinction in International Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, supra, at 95
(explaining that the efforts of feminist activists contributed to the characterization of violence
against women as a public crime).
50.
See, e.g., Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's Rights
to state Protectionfrom Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 507, 509
(1993).
51.
See Copelon, supra note 45, at 867.
52.
Id.
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the international system.53 A significant achievement was the 1993
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.5'4 Although
aspirational and nonbinding, it placed the subject explicitly in an
international forum and sought accountability from states. Its provisions
recognized violence against women as a human rights problem and
called the attention of all nations to face this issue.55
The events put in motion by the Vienna Conference were significant
in many other respects as well. To assert that a particular social claim is
a human right is to vest it emotionally and morally with an especially
high order of legitimacy. 6 The new legitimacy thrust the U.N. Human
Rights Commission to appoint the first Special Rapporteur57 on Violence
Against Women-Its Causes and Consequences,58 who was to study the
status of violence against women and report back annually to the Commission. It, in turn, has accepted the reports of Special Rapporteur
Radhika Coomarasawamy by annual resolutions.59
The recognition of gender-motivated violence as a human rights
problem is only the first step, however. The creation of effective remedies for noncompliance with or transgressions of these rights is perhaps
more fundamental than the first. Though human rights law disputes traditional notions of state sovereignty, the latter still saddles remedial
schemes with historical, legal, and political obstacles. 60 Still, the interna53.
Id.
54.
Declarationon the Eliminationof Violence against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 217, U.N. Doc. A/RES.48/104 (1994) [hereinafter Declaration].
55.
Over 175 states adopted the Declaration, accepting domestic violence as a human
rights problem. Some commentators point out, however, referring to national laws specifically,
that "campaigns for women's legal rights are at best a waste of energy and at worst positively
detrimental to women." Charlesworth, supra note 49, at 60-61 (citing the critique advanced
by the Critical Legal Studies movement). Charlesworth also indicates, however, that feminist
critiques of rights are extraordinarily uncommon with regards to the rights of women in the
international context. Id. at 61.
56.
See Richard B. Bilder, Rethinking InternationalHuman Rights Law: Some Basic
Questions, 1969 WIs. L. REv. 171 (1969); see also Romany, supra note 49, at 85.
57.
A Rapporteur, a French word for reporter, is an investigator with a mandate from a
United Nations organ to engage in a fact-finding mission, usually with regards to investigating
compliance with human rights instruments.
58.
C.H.R. Res. 1994/45, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1994/24-E/CN4/
1994/132 (1994).
59.
See Copelon, supra note 45, at 869; see also Preliminary Report on Violence
Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, submitted by Ms. Radhika Coomarasawamy,
Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights, 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1995/42 (1994) [hereinafter Coomarasawamy Report]; infra notes 93, 100-01, 10710, 118, 122-24 and accompanying texts on Rapporteur Coomarasawamy's observations.
60.
For example, the International Law Commission (ILC)'s draft Articles on state
Responsibility do not mention individuals as participants in the legal relationships causing
breaches of international law. Christian Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims in Instances
of Grave Human Rights Violations: The Position under General InternationalLaw, in STATE
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tional human rights law regime provides individuals who rarely have
access to the international legal system the modest possibility of raising
legal claims in domestic courts for breaches of norms protected at the
international level.6'
For example, The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women recognizes a state's duty of "due diligence to prevent,
investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of
violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state
or by private persons." 62 The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, 63 also
recognizes that women have the right to be free from violence, the right
to life, 65 the right to physical, mental, and moral integrity,66 the right to
sexual non-discrimination, the right to liberty and security, the right to
equal protection under the law,69 and the right to judicial protection. 0
These rights, in turn, must be protected by the state and breaches of its
norms remedied in domestic courts.7 ' In Section 3 below, I discuss specific elements of state responsibility and compliance with treaty
obligations codifying individual human rights norms.

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

1 (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian Tomuschat eds.,

1999) (citing the Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth
session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 125, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996)).
61.
See Charlesworth, supra note 49, at 58.
62.
Declaration,supra note 54, art. 4(c).
The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
63.
Violence Against Women, opened for signature June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (entered into
force Mar. 5, 1995).
64.
Id. art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
65.
Id. art. 4(a), 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
66.
Id. art. 4(b), 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
67.
Id. art. 6(a), 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
68.
Id. art. 4(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
69.
Id. art. 4(f), 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
70.
Id. art. 4(g), 33 I.L.M. at 1535.
71.
Id. art. 7, 8, 33 I.L.M. at 1536. Among duties of states under the Convention are to
"include in their domestic legislation penal, civil, administrative and any other type of
provisions that may be needed to prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women and to
adopt appropriate administrative measures where necessary" Id. art. 7(c), 33 I.L.M. at 1536; to
"establish fair and effective legal procedures for women who have been subjected to violence
which include, among others, protective measures, a timely hearing and effective access to
such procedures" Id. art. 7(f), 33 I.L.M. at 1536; to "establish the necessary legal and
administrative mechanisms to ensure that women subjected to violence have effective access
to restitution, reparations or other just and effective remedies" Id. art. 7(g), 33 I.L.M. at 1536;
and "to counteract prejudices, customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on the stereotyped roles for men and
women which legitimize or exacerbate violence against women." Id. art 8(b), 33 I.L.M. at
1536.
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2. The Role of the InternationalCovenant
on Civil and PoliticalRights

The Covenant explicitly recognizes that gender discrimination is a
violation of a fundamental human right. 2 It grants the citizens of signatories the right to gender and race equality through nondiscrimination
and equal protection provisions." Importantly, it translates previously
held aspirations into binding treaty language through which victims may
now seek recourse.
The Covenant is, perhaps, one of the most important international
human rights treaties ever ratified,74 containing 53 Articles addressing numerous civil and political rights. It opened for signature on December 16,
1966, entered into force in 1976, and as of November 2003 includes 151
state Parties, including the United States.75 The Covenant and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights76 comprise the
International Bill of Rights. These documents were created to assure that
the principles embraced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948 would transcend the initial aspirational commitment.77

The Covenant is not merely aspirational, but has concrete directives
to each signatory to undertake "the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes ...

[and] to adopt such legislative or other

72.
Article 2(1), for example, requires a signatory state "to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights" set forth in the Covenant, "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." ICCPR, supra note 37,
999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74, art. 2(1), 6 I.L.M. at 369. Article 3 further requires state parties "to
undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant." Id. art. 3,999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
73.
In addition to Articles 2 and 3, Article 14 provides that everyone "shall be equal
before the courts and tribunals." ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176-77, 6
I.L.M. at 372-73. Article 26 also sets forth that all "persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law." Id. art 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at
179, 6 I.L.M. at 375.
74.
See David P. Stewart, United States Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings,and Declarations, 42
DEPAUL L. REV. 1183, 1183 (1993) ("Considered by many to be the single most important
human rights treaty, the Covenant guarantees those basic rights and freedoms which form the
cornerstones of a democratic society."). For a less celebratory view on the importance of the
Covenant, see Jack Goldsmith, Should InternationalLaw Trump U.S. Domestic Law?, 1 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 327, 329 (2000) (referring to the provisions of the Covenant as ultimately "nonbinding").
75.
See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status Of
The Ratifications Of The Principal International Human Rights Treaties, at http://
www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
76.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
77.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; see also Global Dimension,
supra note 25, at 41.
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measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in
the present Covenant."78 Also, it does not just focus on negative obligations of states, but requires affirmative steps to implement changes
designed to give effect to rights they agreed to protect. This is apparent,
for example, in Article 2, which requires each state Party "to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant. 79
The obligations states assume under the Covenant are of two kinds:
substantive and procedural.8 0 The substantive obligations address the
type of treatment a signatory owes its citizens and the rights it guarantees on their behalf. The procedural obligations encompass submitting
periodic reports to the Human Rights Committee,"1 the organ charged
with overseeing compliance with the Covenant. The reporting requirement includes a description of measures taken to make effective and
82
in the instrument. Because the Covenant
protect the rights guaranteed
lacks the institutional structure, aside from its reporting mechanisms, to
enforce the rights it guarantees, the provisions put a great deal of weight
on state domestication.83 It is, in this sense, sovereignty friendly.
These procedural and substantive obligations have explicit compliance requirements. For example, the Covenant prohibits torture, and
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 4 guarantees
equality before the law, 5 and requires state signatories to ensure that all
rights be recognized without "distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, or sex.' 86 states are obligated to "ensure that any person whose rights
or freedoms as herein recognized ... are violated shall have an effective
remedy .. . .""That is, compliance requires effective domestic remedies

78.
U.N.T.S.
79.
80.
the Law,

Global Dimension, supra note 25, at 41 (citing ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 2(2), 999
at 173-74, 6 I.L.M. at 369).
ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
See Oscar M. Garibaldi, The Principles of Non-DiscriminationAnd Equality Before
in AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L., U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS

ON HUMAN RIGHTS

54 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) [hereinafter U.S.

RATI-

FICATION].

ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 40, 999 U.N.T.S. at 181-82, 6 I.L.M. at 378.
81.
82.
Id. art. 40(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 181, 6 I.L.M. at 378.
See Article 2(2) for example, where each state Party is instructed "to take the neces83.
sary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give
effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Id. art. 2(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74,
6 I.L.M. at 369.
Id. art. 7,999 U.N.T.S. at 175, 6 I.L.M. at 370-71.
84.
Id. art. 14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 176, 6 I.L.M. at 372.
85.
Id. art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 173, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
86.
Id. art. 3,999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
87.
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for treaty violations. For example, a state's failure to under-enforce domestic violence laws is a violation of Articles 3 and 26 of the Covenant.88
Particularly relevant to this discussion are the Covenant's antidiscrimination provisions set forth in Articles 2(1), 3, and 26. The
international community, in signing the Covenant, has determined that
the requirement of equal protection, among others, is so fundamental a
human right, that the failure of a state to promote equality or prevent
inequality may be considered a violation of international law, which
would trigger the requirement of reparations for a breach of treaty obligations. 9 For example, commentators have explained that the Covenant's
right to equality before the law requires an absence of unequal treatment.
Unequal treatment occurs when rights are conferred, or duties are imposed, on some persons but not on others. 90 Another example of a
potential treaty breach is the unequal application of the law, or the enactment of discriminatory laws. This understanding is similar to
American equal protection doctrine. The doctrine only allows certain
individuals or types of cases meeting specific criteria to gain access to
remedies through the court system. 9'
Gender violence is considered inherently discriminatory under international law because it reflects inequality and it perpetuates it. 92 The
Covenant's anti-discrimination provisions thus include violence against
women as a wrong for which reparations are mandated. That is, even
when it is an individual actor who commits an act of violence against
women, the state is complicit in this violation if it fails to provide an effective remedy. The Human Rights Committee, charged with monitoring
compliance with the Covenant, has also placed the issue of violence
against women directly at the feet of the states. 93 How the state assumes
an obligation for wrongs perpetrated by individual actors is the focus of
the next Section.

88.
For the text of Article 3, see supra, note 72. For the text of Article 26, see supra,
note 73.
89.
See Michele E. Beasley & Dorothy Q. Thomas, Domestic Violence as a Human
Rights Issue, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 323 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) [hereinafter Domestic Violence].
90.
See Garibaldi, supra note 80, at 63.
91.
Id.
92.
See Copelon, supra note 45, at 869.
93.
See Coomarasawamy Report, supra note 59, para. 5. The Commission on Human
Rights has also emphasized "the duty of Governments to take appropriate and effective action
concerning acts of violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the state or
by private persons." Id. The Coomarasawamy Report also specifies that "gender bias in the
administration of justice" is an example of violence against women. Id. para. 7.
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3. International State Responsibility Under the Covenant
The principle of state responsibility under the Covenant is discussed
here to provide background and context to the potential congressional
interest in domesticating the equality provisions of the Covenant. This
interest is inextricably tied to the broader, abstract question of whether
federalism limitations ought to apply to the treaty power. I think it imprudent to present a normative theory of the latter without considering
the former, for any answer, however persuasive, would be incomplete.9
What follows is not intended as an enumeration of the potential ways in
which the United States may or may not be in violation of its treaty obligations. It is rather meant to inform the reader about the plethora of
foreign policy95 implications bound up in a congressional decision to
implement a treaty, in whatever form. In the next part, I add to this discussion the additional implication of judicial involvement in the
management of foreign policy choices. 96
Effective implementation of human rights norms is a daunting undertaking, particularly in the area of state responsibility for individual
actions. The nature of international law, organized around and based almost entirely on the sovereignty of states, aims to protect individuals and
groups from state transgressions rather than individual ones. 97 That is,
the state cannot be found responsible for acts committed by private individuals unless there is some failure on the part of the state to prevent
those transgressions, or they are undertaken by agents of the state.

94.
See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of OriginalMeaning, 85 GEO. L. J. 1765, 1767 (1997) (proposing that theo-

ries of constitutional law must have normative attractiveness as well as descriptive accuracy).
Referring to history in particular, Professor Doff thoughtfully suggests that to make sense of
the text, one must be familiar with the context. Id.
95.
Throughout this Article, I use the terms foreign policy as interchangeable with
foreign relations and foreign affairs. Professor Ramsey has helpfully defined "foreign relations
law" as "the domestic legal constraints upon the conduct of U.S. foreign policy . .. [which]
mostly arise, directly or indirectly, from the U.S. Constitution .... " Michael Ramsey, Review
Essay: Textbook Revisionism: Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law:
Cases andMaterials, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1111, 1113 (2003).

96.
Commentators who advocate a neo-federalist concept of the treaty power, one urging judicial management through the extrapolation of first principles federalism, ought to be
concerned about the implications of that proposal. Though some of the normative propositions
have intuitive appeal, the theories' implications have not been addressed. Yet, judicial involvement implies that the federalism limitations proposed should perhaps run out of steam.
See infra, notes 226-34, 363-69 and accompanying text.
97.
See Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 387, 387 (1999).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 25:265

Though the comparison is imperfect, the structure of state responsibility
resembles Section 1983 liability.98
The theory of state responsibility for failure to protect against violence against women or to provide effective remedies for its redress is
premised on the principle that the beneficiaries of the protections to
which countries have committed are individuals and not the state.99 From
this recognition, it follows that states may be responsible for failing to
meet international obligations even when those violations originate in
the conduct of private individuals.'m The obligation the state has assumed is one of protection, of prevention, and of redress.
This view is not only anticipated by customary international law, but
is also codified in numerous human rights treaties. Generally, states are
held legally responsible for acts or omissions of private persons:
(1) when the person is an agent of the state; (2) when the private acts are
covered by provisions of a treaty as is the case with the Covenant;
(3) when there is state complicity in the wrongs perpetrated by private
actors; and (4) when the state fails to exercise due diligence in the control of private actors.' °'
The dualism between state conduct and private action and how they
are treated under international law is eroding at a reticent pace. Human
rights activists, largely through the efforts of feminist scholars and individuals having suffered atrocities at the hands of the authoritarian
regimes of Latin America during the 1970s and 80s, °2 have contributed
98.
See, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (stating that "a
local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees
or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983"). Other opinions require
"an affirmative link between the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged."
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (plurality opinion). The analogy to
international law is still helpful conceptually. One could say that when a state fails to put into
place effective mechanisms to safeguard the rights of its citizens or to provide for effective
remedies, it becomes complicit in the aggrieving conduct. In this sense, every perpetrator is an
agent of the state when the state creates conditions that facilitate violations.
99.
See Romany, supra note 49, at 97 (quoting Philip Allott, State Responsibility and
the Unmaking of InternationalLaw, 29 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 14 (1988)).
100.
See CoomarasawamyReport, supra note 59, para. 102.
101.
Id. The Report also states:
The obligations of the state with regard to the elimination of violence against
women are comprehensively spelt out in Article 4 of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women. The state is obliged to condemn violence
against women and is expected not to invoke custom, tradition, or religion to avoid
the obligation; the state is expected to pursue all 'appropriate means,' 'without delay' in adopting a policy of eliminating violence against women.
Id. para. 108.

102.
See, e.g., IAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR
AGAINST HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990) (documenting Argentina's dirty
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enormously to bridging the gap created between those acts considered
public and those considered private and how state responsibility should
be viewed in this realm.
Commentators believe that there is a symbiotic relationship between
a state's responsibility for domestic violence and the perpetration of it.' °3
That is, the barrier created to prevent state involvement in the so-called
private sphere of gender-motivated violence is harmful, artificial, and
serves to perpetuate the problem. The aggregate of human rights instruments, such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)'04 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' 5 recognize the artificiality of the
public/private dichotomy and situate domestic violence "within three
universally held norms. First, that it violates basic human rights. Second,
that it constitutes gender discrimination and third, that states' must
take
6
affirmative steps to protect and prevent against such violence."' 0
This is an important step. The Special Rapporteur states that the
greatest cause of violence against women is government inaction.' 7 She
affirms that states are under a positive duty to prevent, investigate, and
punish crimes associated with violence against women,' 8 even when
perpetrated by private actors. This conclusion stems from the premise
that the gender bias socially ingrained in the fabric of society, if unchallenged, becomes a social or cultural norm seen as beyond the purview of
state responsibility rather than as a violation of a woman's human right
for which the state ought to be accountable under international law.' 9
war and the United Nations' failure to intervene); INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
GROUP, CHILE: THE PLEBISCITE AND BEYOND (1989) (describing the human rights abuses in
Chile); LAWRENCE WESCHLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE (1990) (describing the human rights
abuses in Brazil and Uruguay).
103.
See Chinkin, supra note 97, at 388-89.

104.
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. Arguably, this is the most
important of all human rights treaties in the area of protection of women's rights. The United
States has not yet ratified it. Interestingly, CEDAW does not expressly prohibit violence, but
recognizes violence against women as a type of gender discrimination, which is in itself pro-

hibited. General Recommendation 19, UN GAOR Committee on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 11th Sess., art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
105.
ICCPR, supra note 37.
106.
G. Kristian Miccio, With All Due DeliberateCare: Using InternationalLaw and the
Federal Violence Against Women Act to Locate the Contours of state Responsibility for Violence Against Mothers in the Age of Deshaney, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 641, 681-82

(1998).
107.

CoomarasawamyReport, supra note 59,para. 72.

108.

Id.

109.
See, e.g., Coomarasawamy Report, supra note 59, para. 72; Rebecca J. Cook,
Women's InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Way Forward,in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 (Rebecca J.Cook ed., 1994); Miccio,
supra note 106, at 656-68; Domestic Violence, supra note 89, at 323-27; Dorothy Q. Thomas
& Michele E. Beasley, Symposium On Reconceptualizing Violence Against Women By Intimate
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Although the act of violence may well be a private issue, in the sense
that the state itself did not commit the violence, the state's failure to
prosecute stands on equal footing as the crime itself. It victimizes the
victim twice. The denial of equal protection to victims of domestic violence is a public concern and violation of an accepted international
obligation."°
Although important derogations from traditional notions of state
sovereignty have so far been undertaken,"' progress has been slow. Recognition of state responsibility for private conduct has furthermore not
followed a logical or uncontroversial path. No doubt, enforcement of
international obligations has always been the most difficult aspect of the
international legal system, and it is surely the weak link of international
human rights law."' For all the revolutionary advances in the recognition
of human rights, the law still has to develop a coherent theory or consistent practice for reparation for violations of the rights it protects."3 What
exists is a patchwork of doctrine, practices, declarations, and pronouncements.'"4 These can be summarized, if at all, by the proposition
that state responsibility for human rights violations, as a breach of international law, necessitates making reparations." A breach, in turn,
encompasses both affirmative acts and omissions to act. '

Partners:Critical Issues: Domestic Violence As A Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REv. 1119
(1995).
110.
See, e.g., supra, note 109. When investigating the status of women in various countries, the Special Rapporteur observed not only a permissive attitude towards violence against
women, but a tolerance on part of the state for the perpetrators, especially when the violence
occurred within the home sphere. As was reported to the Senate Committee when deliberating
the passage of VAWA, the seriousness of gender-motivated crime in the US as in other countries is rarely acknowledged. CoomarasawamyReport, supra note 59, at para. 72. There exists
also non-recognition of such crimes in the laws of many countries, especially in relation to
domestic violence, marital rape, sexual harassment, and violence associated with traditional
practices. But even when crimes of violence against women are prosecuted, it is rarely done
seriously or with the adequate forcefulness accorded other violent crimes. Ms. Coomaraswamy concludes that in the context of norms recently established by the international
community, a state that does not act against crimes of violence against women is as guilty as
the perpetrators. Id.
111.
See Sibley Lecture, supra note 40, at 32-33; see also Louis Henkin, That "S"
Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization,and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FOROHAM L. REv. 1,
11-12 (1999).
112.
See Sibley Lecture, supra note 40, at 41.
113.
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1999).
114.
See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text. For one of the pioneering cases
holding a government responsible for acts of individuals, see Velaquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No.4 (1988).
115.
Dinah L. Shelton, Private Violence, Public Wrongs, and the Responsibility of states,

13

FORDHAM INT'L

116.

Id.

L. J. 1, 17 n.93 (1990).
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Against this backdrop, the Covenant takes some modest steps in
bridging the gap between rights and remedies. It breaks new ground in
providing a structure that recognizes that some private acts can be attributable to the state. By stating that states have a duty to "take the
necessary steps ... to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized" within it," 7 the Covenant recognizes that a state has a duty of due lgence." Applied to the
gender violence context, this obligation of conduct" 9 signifies that a signatory must establish a system designed to prevent gender-motivated
violence and sex discrimination. An "obligation of conduct" is equivalent to an obligation to protect and fulfill the expectation of a treaty.' It
refers to an affirmative conduct that a state should follow, or refrain from
engaging in it;'2 ' it is process-based.

An "obligation of result" translates into the responsibility to provide
"effective remedies" when a violation sought to be prevented in fact occurs. This obligation looks to the results that a signatory should achieve
rather than the process used to achieve it. These obligations, then, impose an affirmative responsibility not only to create an appropriate
regulatory scheme aimed at addressing and preventing gender discrimination, for example, but also22 to introduce judicial remedies for those
rights considered justiciable.

In fact, the "respect and ensure" provision of Article 2 "embodies an
immediate obligation" to provide effective remedies. 2 3 states, according
to this provision, "are required, by standards of due diligence, to prevent
as well as punish crimes of violence which take place in the private

117.
ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 2(2),, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173-74, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
118.
CoomarasawamyReport, supra note 59, para. 2.
119.
For more on the specific nature of state obligations under the ICCPR, see Egon
Schwelb, The Nature of the Obligationsof the states Parties to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, in 1 AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER: PROBLEMS DE PROTEdON INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HoMME 301, 302 (Rend Cassin ed., 1969) ("[T]he
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes the obligation to ensure the rights recognized
in it immediately and not only progressively.). For a description of the distinction between
obligtation of conduct and obligation of result, see Anja Seibert-Fohr, Domestic Implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Pursuant to its Article 2 para.
2, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 399, 401-03 (2001).
120.
See generally Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights 7 (Jan. 22-26, 1997), at http:I/ wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
Maastrichtguidelines_.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2004).
121.
See ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, RIGHT To ADEQUATE FOOD As A HUMAN
RIGHT § 14, U.N. Sales No. E.89.XIV.2, §§ 70-71 (1989); see also Beasley & Thomas, supra
note 89 (discussing the positive and negative rights component of obligations of conduct and
obligations of result).
122.
Coomarasawamy Report, supra note 59, para. 5
123.
Id. para. 9.
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domain." ' '2' Judicial remedies or the creation of a private cause of action
for breach of the rights protected, are considered an efficient and
preferred mechanism. The failure of a state to do so is a violation of an
affirmative obligation.
An omission to act can result from a choice of inaction: not to provide a system of effective remedies. The theory is that the failure to
protect women against gender-based violence, which protection includes
establishing a system of effective legal remedies, results in complicity on
the part of the state:
In effect, the state creates a parallel government in which
women's rights are systematically denied. The state thus function as an accomplice to the actual human rights violations and
can be held responsible for them. Second, the state can be responsible for failing to fulfill its obligation to prevent and punish
violence against women in a nondiscriminatory fashion,
a failure
25
denying women the equal protection of the law.'
The obligation may require the enactment of laws shielding rights
against certain forms of interference from private parties as well as from
the government itself. In addition, Article 2 requires the assurance of an
"effective remedy" for the violation of covered rights, 126 to be determined
by a "competent authority,"'27 and encourages states parties "to develop
the possibilities of judicial remedy.' ' 128 A comparison can in fact be drawn
between state responsibility to protect foreign nationals without regards
to whether the violation has taken place in the public or private sphere
and that to redress violations of women's rights. 29
This principle of state responsibility for complicity in "private"
wrongs had its genesis in the "respect and ensure" provision of the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. para. 70.
Romany, supra note 49, at 99.
ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 2(3)(a), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
Id. art. 2(3)(b), 999 U.N.T.S. at 174, 6 I.L.M. at 369.
Id.
See Romany, supra note 49, at 102. For example, Romany states that:

Contextualization is crucial to understanding the nature of state responsibility for
the violation of women's human rights. The systematic exclusion of women by intemational law structures becomes a normative link in bridging the gap between
norms of state responsibility for redressing injury to aliens and human rights violations. The exclusion of women from formulating norms that encompass the private
sphere, that area of life in which their most basic rights are systematically violated,
makes them the paradigmatic alien-the outsider, the foreigner, the stateless subject.
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American Convention on Human Rights'3 ° as interpreted by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in Velazquez Rodriguez v. Honduras.3 '
The Court held that, under Article 1(1) of the American Convention,
requiring the state to "ensure... the free and full exercise of... rights and
freedoms,"'32 the Honduran government was responsible for politically
motivated disappearances not overtly carried out by government
officials.'33 The Court thus articulated a doctrine of state responsibility
that derived its normative foundations from the obligation to domesticate
human rights protections,
by focusing on "effectiveness" as a substantial
34
component.
analytical
Honduras had argued that it was not responsible for the disappearances because it was not cognizant of them nor did it take part in their
occurrence.' The Court rejected this argument and held Honduras responsible. It reasoned that Honduras's failure to prevent the
those responsible rendered the country comdisappearances or to punish
36
plicit in the violations.
Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, charged with
enforcing the provisions of the American Convention on Human
Rights'37 in those cases in which state signatories to the Convention have
accepted its jurisdiction,' has stated that Article 25(1) requires procedural systems to be effective in remedying violations:
[I]t is not sufficient that [a remedy] be provided for the Constitution
or by law or that it be formally recognized, but rather it must be truly
130.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9
I.L.M. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
131.
Velaquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988).
132.
American Convention, supra note 130.
133.
Rodiguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 at 159.
134.
See Romany, supra note 49, at 101.
135.
Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 at 133.
136.
Id. at 156-58; see also Romany, supra note 49, at 102.
137.
American Convention, supra note 130.
138.
Id. art. 62, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159, 9 I.L.M. at 691-92. The United States has not
accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. See Press Release No. 21/98, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., Acceptance of the Obligatory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court by Brazil and
Mexico (Dec. 15, 1998), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/press.htm. Unconditional acceptances of the court's contentious jurisdiction have been made by Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Id. The Dominican Republic acceded on February 22, 1999. See Press Release No. 7/99, InterAm. C.H.R. para. 27 (Mar. 16, 1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/Comunicados/
English/1999/Press.htm. The United States cannot accept the jurisdiction of the Court because
it has not ratified the Convention. See Signatures and Current Status of Ratifications,American Convention on Human Rights, in ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, INTERAMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

771, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.LV/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. (1997).
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effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human
rights and in providing redress. A remedy which proves illusory because
of the general conditions prevailing in the country, or even in the particu39
lar circumstances of a given case, cannot be considered effective.1
Unaddressed domestic violence becomes a problem of the state under international law when there is a systemic failure to prosecute,
prevent, or protect, and where such omissions constitute discrimination
prohibited by an international agreement.'4 ° As an example of accrued
state responsibility for acts of omission amounting to discrimination, the
Human Rights Committee, charged with reviewing individual petitions
under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant14 ' and issuing recommendations, found that Peruvian legislation discriminated on the basis of sex
by prohibiting married women from filing civil suits and thus violated
the Covenant's provisions on equality.'42 Similarly, in the Neer claim, the
General Claims Commission of the United States and Mexico found that
"international standards obligated governmental authorities to take affirmative actions to investigate and apprehend a wrongdoer and that
failure to do so would43be a breach of a legal duty, giving rise to international responsibility."'
These cases exemplify that the theory of "unequal legal applicability"-a violation of the Equal Protection provision-demands greater
diligence in the implementation and protection of human rights norms. 4
Inattention constitutes not only a violation of the antidiscrimination provisions of the Covenant but also evidence of the complicity needed to
make out a substantive violation. 41
The failure of equal protection, then, is the jurisdictional hook that
turns "private" domestic violence into a public international law enforceable issue.
Non-prosecution of the crimes of private individuals becomes a
human rights issue (assuming no state action or direct complicity) only if the reason for the state's failure to prosecute can be
shown to be rooted in discrimination along prohibited lines, such
139.

Advisory Opinion No. 9, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 33, OEA/ser.A, OC-9/87 (1987).

140.

See Miccio, supra note 106, at 661; see also Culliton, supra note 50, at 513.

141.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)

[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
142.
Culliton, supra note 50, at 542 (citing G. Ato del Avellanal v. Peru, Report of the
Human Rights Committee, 34th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/40, Communication No. 202/1986

(1989)).
143.
Shelton, supra note 115, at 24 (citing Neer Claim, 4 R.I. A. A. 60 (U.S.-Mex. Gen.
Claims Comm'n 1926)).
144.
Id.; see also Cook, supra note 109, at 22.
145.
Shelton, supra note 115, at 24.
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as those set forth in Article 26 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'"
The state's international obligation is to protect citizens' lives, liberty,
and security against private acts
in an equal manner, devoid of discrimi47
nation on forbidden grounds.'
The point of this discussion is not to argue that the United States is
in violation of its treaty obligations, for I do not think a substantive case
could be made for that proposition. But the discussion illustrates that the
principles of state responsibility are particularly relevant to Congress's
enactment of the VAWA against the evidentiary backdrop of widespread
discriminatory practices on the part of the states. There need not be an
international transgression for the treaty-makers to domesticate treaty
provisions that take into account the principles discussed. The treaty
power allows at least this policy judgment.
B. The VAWA as Implementing Legislationfor the ICCPR
1. The Violence Against Women Act and United States v. Morrison
The United States still has to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),' 48 and the
United States Supreme Court has not been hospitable to congressional
legislation addressing violence against women, such as the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA).' 49 VAWA was a symbolic victory for
women's equality,' ° and represented to at least one official source an
effort to implement the equality and nondiscrimination provisions of the
Covenant.' 5 ' It signified the federal government's first official attempt at
a comprehensive response to the social and
legal problems posed by
52
various forms of gender-motivated violence.
146.
See Domestic Violence, supra note 89, at 327.
147.
Id.
148.
CEDAW, supra note 104.
149.
VAWA, supra note 35.
150.
Sally F Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIo
ST. L.J. 1, 57 (2000). The VAWA was not free of controversy, however. It was a legislative
compromise above all. Proponents were discontent with the model being too exclusive, the
remedial provisions being too narrow and underinclusive, and the adverse effects the civil
remedy provision could have on men of color, among other concerns. Reconstructing Equality, supra note 46, at 403-04.
151.
See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.

152.

See Goldfarb, supra note 150, at 5-6. Congress enacted the statute in 1994 as part

of an omnibus crime measure, which passed the House by a vote of 235 to 195 and the Senate
by a vote of 61-38. Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality Meet: The
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The Act was a comprehensive measure that provided over $800 million in grants to the states to improve law enforcement efforts and the
prosecution of crimes of gender-motivated violence, as well as to enhance education and services in the domestic abuse area."3 It was
enacted to remedy states' inaction in domestic violence cases and to help
victims overcome the ingrained societal notions that "violence was chosen by choosing a relationship. '54 By creating a federal cause of action
against gender-motivated violence, the Act treated violence against
women as a discrimination issue rather than as a private harm.'55 According to Professor Goldfarb, "one of the primary goals of the supporters of
the Act was to overcome centuries of assumptions about the public and
private spheres
that have operated to deny women the full equality under
56
law.'
the
Most importantly, the Act created a federal civil remedy provision
that established a substantive right to be free of gender-motivated violence and provided for enforcement of this right. 5 7 This legislative
choice placed the issue of violence against women squarely in the domain of public law, rather than relegating it to private law remedies or no
legal remedies at all.' Section 13981 allowed a victim to bring a federal
claim for "any act that would be considered a felony, including rape and
spouse abuse, regardless of whether any criminal charges have been

Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 36 (1996); Holly
Idelson & David Masci, Crime Bill Provisions, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3526 (Dec. 10,
1994). It was signed into law as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
153.
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 3786 (2003); 42 U.S.C.A. § 3793 (2003); see also Violence
Against Women Act Of 1994 tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994); 42 U.S.C.
§ 10148 (1995).
154.
Nourse, supra note 152, at 4.
155.
See Goldfarb,supra note 150, at 7.
156.
Id. at 7-8. The statute criminalizes committing domestic violence or violating a
protection order across state lines, requires states to accord full faith and credit to protection
orders issued in other states, authorizes federal grants to increase the effectiveness of police,
prosecutors, judges, and victim services agencies in cases of violent crime against women,
provides funding for national toll-free domestic violence hotline, increases federal financial
support for battered women's shelters, reforms immigration law to protect battered immigrant
women, amends the Federal Rules of Evidence to extend rape shield protection to civil as well
as criminal cases, and calls for expanded research and record-keeping on violence against
women. VAWA, supra note 35.
157.
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). Subsection (a) states that the purpose of the provision is "to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote
public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal
civil rights cause of action for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender." Id. § a.
158.
See Goldfarb, supra note 150, at 57.
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brought."'5 9 The victim could seek compensatory and punitive damages,
and injunctive and declaratory relief.' 6°
Congress compiled an impressive record on the economic effects of
gender-motivated violence. Four years of congressional hearings uncovered widespread failure of states to address the harms of inequality in the
charging and prosecution of and under-enforcement of penalties for violent crimes against women. It set forth several reasons for enacting the
statute: gender-motivated violence is an issue national in scope that
should be addressed at the federal level;' 6 1 the gender-gap in civil rights
laws should be closed with the creation of a civil remedy provision addressing gender-motivated violence explicitly and exclusively;6 and that
there is a need to rectify the systemic problem
of gender discrimination
63
system.
justice
criminal
the
in
place
taking
The economic evidence was poignant. A "partial estimate" revealed
that violent crimes against women cost this country between 5 and 10
billion dollars a year.' 64 This was because violence against women deterred them from traveling interstate, caused women to miss work and
accrue more medical bills and other related costs, and decreased demand
and supply for interstate products. 65 This evidence was a direct challenge
to long-standing assumptions that gender-motivated violence had no impact on society,166 as well as to the private/public dichotomy.
Congress also documented extensive state inaction in protecting
women against domestic violence. This inaction ranged from failure to
prosecute violence and under-enforcement of criminal laws, to misclassification of domestic battering as simple assault. 67 The Senate Judiciary
Committee reported a "widespread gender bias in the courts, particularly

159.
at 20.
160.

See Henry J.Reske, An Untested Remedy for Abused Women, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995,
See 42 U.S.C. § 1398 1(c). It states:

A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state) who commits a crime of violence motivated by
gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) of this Section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate.
Id.
161.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993).
162.
S.REP. No. 101-545, at 41 (1990).
163.
S.REP. No. 103-138, at 49; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1995), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1803, 1853.
164.
S.REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993).
165.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1995).
166.
See Goldfarb, supra note 150, at 49.
167.
S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41.
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in cases of rape and domestic violence.' 68 The legislative record showed
that state remedies (where available) failed because legal rules and practices continued to shine a spotlight of suspicion on the victim, rather
than focus on the seriousness of the crime. There existed, as well, a
widespread pattern of gender bias in police practices,
in prosecutorial
9
16
discretion, and in the attitude of judicial officers.
The Senate concluded, based on numerous commissioned studies by
various state task forces, that crimes against women were treated less
seriously than similar crimes perpetrated against men. 70 Unequal treatment resulted from police refusing to take reports and taking accusations
less seriously than they did with other crimes, prosecutors encouraging
defendants to plead to minor offenses, and judges ruling against victims
on evidentiary issues. 17' This evidence showed, in the Judiciary Committee's judgment, that "gender bias permeates the court system and that
women are most often its victims."'72 VAWA and its civil remedy provision in particular were thus deemed necessary to counter at least in part
the prevalent discrimination that abused women faced.
However, in United States v. Morrison, 73 the Supreme Court struck
down Section 13981 as an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce
74
Power and as improper legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court held that gender-motivated violence was not an "economic"
activity that Congress could reach through the Commerce Clause. 75 The
Court rejected the voluminous record documenting the aggregate economic effects of domestic violence, because it feared that such
inferential reasoning could lead Congress to over-regulate almost any
area. 1 76 It stated, "[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence

168.
Id. at 44.
169.
Id. at 42-47.
170.
Id. at 49 n.52.
171.
Id. at 42.
172.
Id. at 49 (quoting Lynn Hecht Schafran, Overwhelming Evidence: Reports on Gender Bias in the Courts, TRIAL, Feb. 1990, at 28). The Committee further stated:
Other remedies have proven inadequate to protect women against violent crimes
motivated by gender animus. Women often face barriers of law, of practice, and of
prejudice not suffered by other victims of discrimination .... Study after study has
concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting women are often treated less seriously than comparable crimes affecting men.
Id. This conclusion derived from evidence submitted by seventeen commission studies task
force reports on gender bias in state supreme courts. Id.
173.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
174.
Id.at 617-18, 621.
175.
Id.at 613.
176.
Id. at 615-16.
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that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved
in interstate commerce has always been the province of the states.' 7
The Court also rejected the provision as inappropriate legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment because the requisite "state
action" requirement was missing.7 7 Although Congress claimed that there
was widespread discrimination at the state level, the Court reasoned that
the civil remedy provision was targeted at individuals and visited
no con79
sequences on the state or state officials alleged to be involved.
Thirty-six states and Puerto Rico submitted an amicus brief supporting Congress's power to enact the VAWA.' 80 Amici states urged to Court
to uphold Section 13981 because the states were deeply affected by the
economic and social costs that domestic violence exacted.'"" The states
asserted that the VAWA, with its cooperation provisions, "has changed
the way the nation addresses the crimes of domestic violence and sexual
assault and has made a positive difference in thousands of women's
lives."'82 But the civil remedy provision ceased to be. It led a very short,
though significantly influential life.
2. The Foreign Policy and International Human
Rights Law Considerations
Envision a foreign policy doctrine that would have the effect of putting the United States in breach of its international obligations in
deference to a state rights doctrine of recent vintage.'83 Imagine further a
legal landscape that would require, by judicial fiat, the President and the
Senate to ignore general principles of international law that require parties to perform their treaty obligations notwithstanding inconsistent
domestic law provisions. In its judicial incarnation, this hypothetical foreign policy doctrine would require a court to parse through the
provisions of a multi-lateral agreement to ascertain whether there are any
bargained-for commitments that interfere with a state prerogative, which
177.
Id. at 618.
178.
Id. at 621.
179.
Id.
180.
See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Arizona et al., United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029), available at 1999 WL 1032809 [hereinafter States'
Brief]. A group of law professors also filed an amicus brief urging the Court to sustain the
VAWA as permissible implementing legislation for the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. See Brief of Amici Curiae InternationalLaw Scholars and Human Rights
Experts, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (No. 99-0005, 99-0029), available at
1999 WL 1032805 [hereinfter Scholars' Brief].
181.
States'Brief,supra note 180, at *1.
182.
Id.
183.
See JOHN NORTON MOORE, TREATY INTERPRETATION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
RULE OF LAw (2001). Professor Moore prods one to consider this question against the backdrop
of the international law principles of pacta sunt servanda and mutuality of obligation. Id.
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finding should presumably lead to a declaration that the treaty itself (or
the offending provision) is unconstitutional on first principles federalism
grounds.
As self-serving as the above hypothetical is, it illustrates a point. It
highlights the potential liabilities stemming from a federalism doctrine
that limits the treaty making power, and/or treaty implementing legislation, without considering the context in which that power resides and
operates. This might lead to building a Chinese wall between the country's foreign policy reality and the academic prescriptions of what ought
to be the norm of domestic constitutional law with respect to treaty making. The foreign policy of the United States is, in part, inextricably tied
to its accession to treaties. Treaty ratification is, uniquely, a statement
about the country's foreign policy choices, and the ratification of the
Covenant is no exception. The obligations assumed under the Covenant,
as well as responses of the international participants to that treaty regime, ought to be considered, more than with a passing nod, when
searching for an answer to the Holland caveat.
The United States ratified the Covenant in 1992,"4 14 years
after it was first presented to the Senate.' 8- It consented to the
treaty with five reservations, 8 6 five understandings,18 and four
184.
Former President Bush, in urging the Senate to ratify the Covenant, stated that ratification would "strengthen our ability to influence the development of appropriate human rights
principles in the international community and provide an additional and effective tool in our
efforts to improve respect for fundamental freedoms in many problem countries around the
world." S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 25 (1992); see also Civil Liberties, supra note 25, at 1649.
185.
The United States was slow to ratify the Covenant. President Jimmy Carter originally sent it to the Senate for its advice and consent in 1978, 12 years after it opened for
signature. S. ExEc. REP. No. 102-23, at 2; see also InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights: Hearing before the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 102d Cong. (1991).
186.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as a "unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting,
approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect
of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 2(l)(d), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333, 8
I.L.M. 679, 681. A reservation effectively alters the relationship between the state making the
reservation and other states party to the treaty. Dinah Shelton, InternationalLaw, in U.S.
RATiFICATION, supra note 80, at 30. See Appendix for the full text of the United States' reservations to the Covenant. The Human Rights Committee concluded that the United States
reservations to Articles 6(5) (juvenile offenders subjected to the death penalty) and Article 7
(prohibition of torture, and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment) were
incompatible with the purposes of the Covenant. See Considerationof Reports Submitted by
states Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Comments of the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., 1413th mtg., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 50 (1995) [hereinafter
Comments of the Human Rights Committee]. Finland, The Netherlands, France, Germany,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden also objected to the United States' reservations to the
ICCPR. Id.
187.
An understanding, unlike a reservation, does not change the substantive provisions
of a treaty. Rather, it is offered as a clarification or explanation of a treaty provision, related to
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declarations... (RUD's), and declared the treaty to be non-selfexecuting."' There were several indications that both Congress and the
Executive Branch were aware of the international dimensions of violence
9 Against the background of
against women when enacting the VAWA."'
the preceding discussion and what follows, the civil remedy provision
could have been upheld as constitutionally permissible legislation to implement several provisions of the Covenant.
The United States, through its officials, represented to the international community that the domestic protection of women's rights was at
the center of its human rights agenda. In its mandatory 1994 report under
the Covenant, it indicated to the Human Rights Committee' 9' that the

its significance and meaning in the domestic context. See Anne M. Williams, United States
Treaty Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 80, at 41; see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control over the Conclusion and Operation of
Treaties, 67 CHI. KENT L. REv. 571, 585 (1991) (defining understandings as simply statements of interpretation assumed to be consistent with a treaty (citing S. ExEC. REP. No. 96-14,
at 34 (1979)). For the full text of the United States' understandings to the Covenant, see the
Appendix.
188.
A declaration is a statement by the signatory state reflecting a particular domestic
preoccupation not openly related to the treaty's meaning or to the substance of the international duties assumed under the treaty. Williams, supra note 187, at 42. At least under
international law standards, a condition imposed unilaterally is not part of the treaty, and it is
thus not the "supreme law of the land," although it may have legal effect domestically. Id. at
42-43. For the full text of the United States' declarations, see the Appendix.
189.
See Declaration 1, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). The Bush
administration's stated, inter alia, that "The intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create
a private cause of action in U.S. courts." S. EXEC. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (March 24, 1992).
190.
See VAWA, supra note 25, at 211. Professor Paust points out that certain provisions
of the VAWA enable battered immigrant women to obtain protection through domestic courts.
Id. at 211 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv) (1994)).
191.
The Human Rights Committee established under the Covenant has very little investigative power. The United States did not ratify the first Optional Protocol, which would have
enabled victims of human rights violations at the hands of the government to file complaints.
See Optional Protocol, supra note 141. However, by accepting "the competence of the Human
Rights Committee to receive and consider communications under Article 41," the United
States opens itself up to complaints by other signatory states. See Declaration 3, 138 CONG.
REC. S478 1-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). This is a relatively safe move because signatory states
are reluctant to lodge complaints against other states in the fear of jeopardizing diplomatic
relations. The United States must, however, submit a periodic report to the Committee on its
compliance with the provisions of the Covenant. ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 40, 999 U.N.T.S.
at 181-82, 6 I.L.M. at 378; see also Consideration of Reports Submitted by states Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Report of the United States of America, U.N. GAOR
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., 1401st mtg. para. 38, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1401 (1995)
[hereinafter Initial Report]. The United States was required to submit a second report by September 1998. As of January 1, 2004, it has yet to fulfill that obligation. See Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Reporting Status, International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, United States of America's Reporting Round: 2, at http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf.
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VAWA was a first step toward implementing legislation it was92 considering in giving full effect to its obligations under the Covenant.1
John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor under the Clinton Administration, stated to the Human
Rights Committee that the full realization of the rights of women was a
central feature of the human rights process in America.' 93 He assured the
Human Rights Committee that, "our national experience demonstrates
that legal guarantees of human rights are a prerequisite to social progress, not the other way around."' 94 In this vein, he recognized the
ineffectiveness of proclaiming the protection of human rights norms
through an international instrument, if those protections cannot meaningfully be realized and enforced domestically.' 9 He charged the United
States government with the responsibility to implement the international
obligations assumed under the treaty. 96 His statements were echoed by
another Justice Department official who asserted that violence against
women in the United States is "now ... recognized as [a] violation of
our human rights .. ." and that the civil remedy provision is an example
of legislation designed to address violations of those rights.'97
The Committee praised the United States for the quality of its report
and for the quality of the American Delegation's presentation of the report. It had many positive comments about the rich constitutional
tradition of protecting human rights and freedoms in the United States.9
And it welcomed the federal government's efforts to take judicial, legislative, and administrative measures to ensure state compliance with
human rights and fundamental freedoms, including implementing legislation.' 99

192.

See InitialReport, supra note 191, para. 29. It stated:

The Administration had also enacted the Violence Against Women Act which was
the most comprehensive federal effort in its field. It was particularly noteworthy for
its coverage of domestic violence and sexual assault, and federal courts were empowered to order broad restitution measures for the victims against persons
convicted of such offences.

Id.
193.
Id. para. 5.
194.
John Shattuck, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Report of the United States of America Under the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (September 1994) at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/erc/law/covenant94/02.html.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
VAWA, supra note 25, at 213 (citing Scholars' Brief, supra note 180, citing the
statement of Bonnie Campbell, Director of the Violence Against Women Office, Department
of Justice, Sept. 12, 1995).
198.
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 186, at 2-3.
199.
Id. at 2.
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But for all the laudatory statements for the United States' pledging
commitment to enact domestic provisions promoting gender equality and
countering violations of it, many countries expressed "[c]oncern... that
United States citizens had received no additional benefit from ratification
of the Covenant." 23 The Human Rights Committee pointed to the lack of
domestic measures to make the rights effective, and questioned whether
the rights were even guaranteed to the people under domestic regimes. It
noted that despite the existence of antidiscrimination laws, there remains
within American society "discriminatory attitudes and prejudices based
on race or gender.' 2° United States accession to the treaty appeared in
the eyes of the Committee to accomplish nothing but reaffirm what is
already part of its law. 202
The United States had assured the Committee and its members that
"[riatification had already resulted in a comprehensive evaluation of
United States legal protections of civil and political rights and had focused public greater attention on the review process."2 3 However, it
acknowledged remaining impediments to fully protecting gender equality and providing remedies for discrimination.2
With respect to gender discrimination, the obstacles manifested
themselves in at least two forms: the failure to inform the judiciary about
the obligations assumed under the Covenant and the Federalism understanding 25 potentially limiting appropriate implementation at the state
level. With respect to the judiciary, the Committee expressed concern
that judges, both at the state and federal levels, had not been made aware
200.
Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Report of the United States of America, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d
Sess., 1405th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (1995) [hereinafter Initial Report Continued].
201.
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 186, at 2.
202.
Id. at 3.
203.
Initial Report Continued,supra note 200.
204.
Id.
205.
See Understanding 5, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). This understanding states in part: "to the extent that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction
over such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures appropriate to the Federal
System to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take
appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant." Id. For the effect of this understandings, see Brad R. Roth, Understanding the "Understanding": Federalism Constraints on
Human Rights Implementation,47 WAYNE L. REV. 891 (2001). Professor Roth proposes that a
fair reading of the Federalism Understanding (taken by the U.S. to the Covenant) would require prevention of the enhancement of federal power at the expense of state power. This
suggestion, though helpful, does not clarify the effect of the understanding on domestic law.
Congress certainly did not think it was enhancing its power to the detriment of the states when
it enacted the VAWA. Professor Neuman, on the other hand, dismisses the argument that the
understanding has any significance for domestic law, suggesting that it is wholly circular.
GlobalDimension, supra note 25, at 33; see also Stewart, supra note 74.
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of the obligations the United States assumed under the Covenant.20 This
comment was in response to the United States' assurance that the Covenant's status as a non-self-executing treaty did not prevent courts' "from
207
seeking guidance from the Covenant in interpreting American law.
With respect to the "federalism understanding" Congress attached to
the Covenant, its report stated that it would not exempt the states or the
nation from complying with the Covenant's requirements.2 8 Although
the "federal government could not dictate the basic form or internal
workings of state government, ... it could establish and enforce uniform
standards for the respect of civil and political rights, which could include
direct invalidation of any offending laws at the state level.' '2° This broad
statement about the capacity of federal law to reign in non-complying
states seems doubtful under first principles federalism. In any case, the
absence of formal mechanisms to ensure appropriate implementation by
the states, the Committee noted, would lead to an unsatisfactory application of the obligations assumed.10 It expressed "regret" that "the report
contained few references to the implementation of the Covenant rights at
the state level.'
The concerns expressed by the Committee should inform the dialogue about the scope of the treaty power and the permissibility of
implementing legislation. The status of treaty obligations within domestic law ought to take into account the way nations deal with each other
and their subdivisions. 2" According to Professor Bederman, "[f]ar from
being peripheral to discussions of foreign policy initiatives-the preserve
of elite policymakers and opinion-leaders-international law is seen as
increasingly central to the successful conduct of U.S. foreign policy.' ,2 3
Conversations between the United States and international bodies reflect
the country's policy choices and the international community's reaction.
Avoiding the indictment of hypocrisy by the international community,
however this community is defined, is a valid consideration for both the
President and the Congress. In the area of human rights especially, the
United States is greatly susceptible to such indictment.
The United States' position has been one of favoring implementing
legislation for human rights treaties despite strong opposition from some
members of Congress. President Clinton recognized the country's
206.
207.
208.

Comments of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 186, at 3.
Id.
Initial Report Continued,supra note 200, at 4.

209.

Id.

210.
211.
212.
213.
Policy, 50

Comments of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 186, at 2.
Id. at 1.
Contextual Determinism, supra note 34, at 367.
David J. Bederman, Globalization, International Law and United States Foreign
EMORY L. J. 717, 717 (2001).
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international obligations through declaring on Human Rights Day 1998
through an executive order that "[i]t shall be the policy and practice of
the Government of the United States ... fully to respect and implement
its obligations
under the international human rights treaties to which it is
214
a party."
Implementation of human rights norms has been virtually nonexistent, however. This is a startling statement for international observers
given that human rights have become a staple of U.S. foreign policy
since the 1970s. 25 The federal government has sought to penalize human
rights violating states by ending "economic assistance, withholding diplomatic support, opposing multilateral loans, and refraining from
licensing crime control equipment or supplying military assistance and
training. , 216 It has explained military interventions in other countries by
the need to protect the human rights of the people within the invaded
country.2 The most recent manifestation of this foreign policy initiative
is the invasion of Iraq.18
Manifesting such concern for protection of human rights in other
states, the United States ought to have the legislative capacity to bring its
own domestic law in compliance with the international responsibilities it
has acquired through a constitutionally established process. As is more
fully explained in the next Section, it should be able to do so unimpeded
by doctrinal limitations that do not take into account the significant implications of the Holland caveat and which do not weigh the political
and structural costs of judicial involvement in the management or policing of foreign policy choices. Case reporters are replete with references
to the elected branches' exclusivity over foreign affairs and the Congress's power to domesticate treaties. 2 1' However, in practice, the

judiciary has not treated these affairs as exclusive to other branches.
214.

Exec. Order No. 13107, 3 C.F.R. 234, 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 (1998).
See Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, Conclusion to U.S. RATIFICATION, supra
note 80, at 286.
216.
Id.
217.
Global Dimension, supra note 25, at 47.
218.
See, e.g., Luis Mesa Delmonte, Economic Sanctions, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign Policy,
11 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 345 (2001) (describing the United States' foreign
policy with respect to Iraq over an extended period of time). This foreign policy may have
triggered instability in the region.
219.
See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) ("Matters intimately related to
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.");
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (holding that the chief power
over foreign relations rests with the President); Missouri v. Holland, 262 U.S. 416, 433
(1920); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (holding that the foreign affairs
power is assigned to the political branches and the judiciary ought not to intervene in deciding
what may be done under this power); Miller v. Albright, No. 98-5511, 1998 U.S. App. WL
846653, at *I (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1998) (per curiam) (refusing to order the Secretary of State

215.
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Unlike the Commerce power, Congress need not-and it should
not-be required to justify the enactment of treaty implementing legislation or the validity of a treaty in the first instance. Yet, the application of
220
standards announced
v. Morrison,
City
r'l
221by cases such as United States
rn222
of Boerne v. Flores, Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents, and University of Alabama v. Garrett,223 for example, would require just that. This is
what commentators opposed to treaty power exceptionalism argue must
be the coherent doctrinal result.
But consider for a moment what this requirement would entail. If the
ratification of the Covenant were challenged on federalism grounds, the
President and Congress would have to show for each provision negotiated with some 150 states, not only that there is a widespread pattern of
human rights abuses across the world and at the state level, but also that
the Covenant is a "proportional and congruent" response to these violations, as required by Boerne. City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 at
520 (1997). Alternatively, the treaty-makers would have to show that
each, or all, of the provisions of the Covenant involve some sort of economic activity of the type contemplated in Morrison. The Covenant
would fail to pass muster on all grounds. The same results would obtain
if the validity of the Convention Against Torture224 or the International
2
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1
were challenged.
This result is demonstrably absurd as a constitutional and as a logical matter, and it is certainly not required to preserve a states' rights
doctrine. At minimum, it is an ill-conceived foreign policy choice. At
worse, it is an unintelligible and hard to defend legal approach to answering the Holland caveat.226 Whatever the merits of first principles
to adopt a particular position during negotiations with Germany as "an unwarranted usurpation of the executive's conduct in foreign relations").
220.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
221.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
222.
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
223.
531 U.S. 356 (2001).
224.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113,24 I.L.M.

535.
225.
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
openedfor signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
226.
All of this assumes, of course, that the question would be justiciable at the threshold, an assumption that is necessary to the theory discussed. Commentators, such as Professor
Bradley, reject the political safeguards protection of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), as an insufficient guarantee. Federalism 1, supra note 17, at 440.
Bradley argues, "the limitations imposed by the Senate to date on human rights treaties do not
prevent a majority of Congress from relying on the treaties, in conjunction with the Necessary
and Proper Clause, as a source of lawmaking power." Id. at 444. This, in his view, is simply an

insufficient protection for the states. Id. at 445.
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federalism, the case has yet to be made that its limitations ought to apply
equally across the Constitutional board, and particularly to the treaty
context.
The thoughtful discussions of revisionists could not possibly mean
to exact this kind of result from the application of their theories. The
problem, I think, lies in the advocacy of abstractions without considering
the consequences of their implementation, or without taking into account
the relevance of international law (whatever one may think about the
validity of international human rights law). But the positions advocated
leave one puzzled as to what different result these commentators would
expect. On the one hand, Professor Bradley argues that "there is a strong
case ... for subjecting the treaty power to the same federalism limitations that apply to Congress's legislative powers. 227 This assertion
clearly refers to the whole of the treaty power. That is, it is addressed to
the President and the Senate's ability to conclude a treaty.
In a later Article, however, he recharacterizes this assertion by stating that what he had meant was that the "best contemporary
construction" of the treaty power, would be "one that would allow the
treatymakers the ability to conclude treaties on any subject but would
limit their ability to create supreme federal law to the scope of Congress's power to do so."228 This revised proposition refers to
implementing legislation rather than to the treaty power itself. No matter
which of the two propositions Professor Bradley endorses, the practical
consequences are the same. The Covenant fails as an initial matter or as
domesticated. If the result in the hypothetical set out above is not what
treaty exceptionalism opponents intend, then I have failed to understand
to what limits they refer.
The argument for limitations would require the Court to exact a policy justification for the wisdom of entering into a treaty on a particular
subject matter in the first place. The thought of such a judicially created
affirmative burden upon the power of the President and the Senate to
enter into international agreements appears incongruous. Rather, the reports of human rights abuses here and abroad that led to the ratification
of the Covenant and other human rights treaties are offered by way of
explaining that it is not an extraordinarily far-reaching idea, nor an unconstitutional usurpation of power, for Congress to implement a portion
of the Covenant through the VAWA, or for the United States to ratify the
Covenant as an initial matter to comply with its international obligations.
Judicial intervention in this sphere, it seems, would be pernicious and
227.
Federalism 1, supra note 17, at 460.
228.
Federalism II, supra note 17, at 100 (responding to Professor Golove's critique of
Federalism , supra note 17).
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would exact a price the country may not be willing to pay-judicial micromanagement of foreign policy, to the same extent the Rehnquist
Court has micromanaged legislative decisions in the federalism cases.
No greater protection would result from judicial involvement, than what
currently exists under the procedural safeguards the Framers put in
place.
3. The Sources of Power for Implementing Legislation
The Framers intended the United States to be a sovereign nation
with all the appropriate powers entrusted to a government with an appropriate choice of means by which to carry out its delegated powers. 229
The treaty clause was enacted to ensure the supremacy of treaties over
state laws and was written with the assumption that ratified treaties
would be the law of the land without further congressional intervention.230 Currently, the default rule appears to be that treaties become the
supreme law of the land when declared to be self-executing,2 3' though
even this proposition is subject to much debate 2 No one argues that
Congress lacks the power to implement treaties. Rather, commentators
advocate that federalism limitations apply to the whole of the treaty
power,233 positing that there ought not to be a treaty power "exceptionalism" or that implementing legislation for treaties ought to be subjected
to the same restrictions as all Article I legislation. I leave the merits of
these propositions to the next Section. I raise them here, however, to
contextualize the importance of considering the sources of power to implement treaties. Just as the international context matters, so does the
doctrinal and historical context of domestication as a legal principle.
The established understanding is that Congress can take action pursuant to the treaty power of an extent that it may not be able to take
pursuant to another power. That is, once a valid treaty is ratified, im229.
230.

CORWIN, supra note 28, at 240.
See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 199 (2d ed. 1996).
231.
Treaties, supra note 31, at 2175.
232.
See, e.g., David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional
Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (2002); Treaties, supra note 31, at 2158-61; Treaties and
Public Law Making, supra note 31, at 2219; Carlos Manuel Vizquez, The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995); Ann Woolhandler, Treaties, SelfExecution, and the PublicLaw Litigation Model, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 757 (2002); see also HENKIN, supra note 230, at 194-96.
233.
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17; FederalismI, supra note 17; Historical Foundations, supra note 17, at 1083; Federalism II, supra note 17, at 104-105
(responding to Professor Golove's Article, HistoricalFoundations).
234.
See Flaherty, supra note 25, at 1279-80. Professor Flaherty presents an elegant
explanation as to why the Commandeering principle of first principles federalism does not and
should not extend to the treaty power. He argues that "the standard interpretive materials of
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plementing legislation is permitted under the Necessary and Proper
Clause even if the subject matter of the statute does not fall within the
powers enumerated in Article 1.235 Although the Framers were aware of
the potential need for implementing legislation (and agreed with the propriety of treaty-makers making use of this mechanism), the modem
practice of domesticating treaties arose not as an inherent requirement of
the treaty power itself, but as a result of the judicial doctrine of non-selfexecution.
The constitutionality and/or acceptability of the doctrine of non-selfexecution, a treaty justiciability question,236 has been extensively contested.23 I do not here address the merits of the debate. I proceed from
the assumption that the doctrine is a valid form of expressing the treatymakers' intent regarding the domestic operation of treaties. My interest,
rather, is how taking account of this doctrine could shape the answer to
the Holland caveat.
Early in our history, Chief Justice Marshall declared that treaties are
contracts between two nations and not legislative acts. 238 In most cases,
he argued, treaties in the United States carry the force of law domestically as soon as they are ratified. For these types of treaties, there is no
need for implementing legislation before the courts can take cognizance
239
of their provisions.
However, when parties enter into a treaty in which they "promise to
perform a particular act," the political branches, rather than the judiciary,
have the obligation to carry out the promise through implementing legislation. 240 Although international law provides standards that determine
when a negotiated treaty is or is not self-executing24' the United States
has followed its own practice in this regard. In recent years, the trend has
been to declare all treaties non-self-executing, particularly in the area of
text, structure, history, and precedent demonstrate that the states' right assault on federal foreign affairs power is as baseless as it is retrograde." Id. at 1278.
235.
The classical case is, of course, Missouri v. Holland,252 U.S. 416 (1920).
236.
Professor Woolhandler combines questions of domestic applicability of treaties
under the doctrine of justiciability. See Woothandler, supra note 232, at 761.
237. See, e.g., Sloss, supra note 232; Woolhandler, supra note 232; Treaties and Public Law

Making, supra note 31, at 2219; Breard, Printz, supra note 31, at 1343; Carlos Manuel
Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695 (1995). See
also, HENKIN, supra note 230, at 194-96.
238.
See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
239.
Id.
240.
Id.
241.
See, e.g., David Sloss, The Domestication of InternationalHuman Rights: Non-Self
Executing Declarationsand Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L. L. 129, 173 (1999);
John Quigley, The InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Supremacy
Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1300-01 (1993); Lori Fisler Damsroch, The Role of the
United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self Executing" Treaties, 67
CHL-KENT L. REV. 515, 522 (1991).

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 25:265

human rights.242 Some commentators have suggested that this is an acceptable political compromise between the branches entrusted with the
treaty power. When the President signs a treaty and the Senate disagrees
with certain provisions, the latter can condition its consent on rendering
the treaty non-self-executing.243
Although this doctrine was not in existence at the time of ratification
of the Constitution, history reveals that there is no explicit prohibition on
grounding implementing legislation on the Necessary and Proper Clause,
or, as other commentators have argued, on the "Punishing Offenses of
the Law of Nations" Clause.2" In fact, the Necessary and Proper Clause
originally outlined the explicit power "to enforce treaties." But it was
stricken as deemed redundant.245
As Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 75, the treaty power is both
executive and legislative in nature, although it might be considered more
legislative than executive. On the one hand, the quality of foreign negotiation falls within the executive power, while the operation of treaties
as laws renders them legislative in nature. And, the exercise of this legislative aspect of the treaty power, "plead[s] strongly for the participation
of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in the office of making
them. 247 James Wilson also stated that the portion of the treaty power
which was vested in the Senate was a combination of both executive and
248
legislative powers.
The means to carry out this power, it was understood, would be
through the Necessary and Proper Clause. Hamilton reported in Federalist No. 33 that this clause was introduced to:

242.
HENKIN, supra note 230, at 201-02. Whether a treaty is declared self-executing or
non-self-executing it is still binding on the United States with respect to the other signatories.
The need for implementing legislation, if it is not a requirement of the treaty, does not change
the nature of the government's international obligations. If implementing legislation is required as a matter of international law, then the failure to conform to the treaty requirements

puts the United States in default of its obligations. Id. at 201-204.
243.
Id. at 202.
244.
See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define
and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations", 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 449
(2000) (stating that the Clause is "central" to Congress's power to regulate through its foreign
affairs power in areas traditionally reserved to the states); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

10.
245.
n. 10).
246.
247.
248.
2 THE

HENKIN, supra

note 230, at 481 n. Ill (citing 1 BUTLER,

THE TREATY POWER

318

THE FEDERALIST No. 75, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

Id.
Statements of James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, reprinted in
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN

505 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) (1836) [hereinafter Statements of James Wilson].
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guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate
authorities of the union. The Convention probably foresaw, that
it has been a principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the
danger which most threatens our political welfare is, that the
state governments will finally sap the foundations of the union;
and might therefore think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to
leave nothing to construction.24 9
James Madison, too, was well aware that some treaties required internal regulations, though he spoke of the objects of treaties as being
external. 20 Historical accounts of the ratification of the Constitution evidence James Madison's discomfort with a broad interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, particularly in the context of Congress's
power to create a national bank, the subject of debate preceding
McCulloch v. Maryland.25 1 But the discomfort was confined to a construction of the clause to create powers not already enumerated. The
treaty power was explicitly granted, and even for Madison, was not left
to implication. 2
For James Wilson, the issue of implementing legislation seemed
fairly straightforward. In enacting domestic legislation, he said, our
"consent" alone is required. But for a treaty, the consent of a foreign
sovereign is also required 3 Moreover, even though the Constitution denies the House a role, it was understood that "their legislative authority
will be found to have strong restraining influences upon both President
and Senate."2 He explicitly suggested that if implementing legislation
would be required, both the Senate and the President would have to rely
on the House to secure such implementation.2 5
249.

No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 3 THE
1787, at 239 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
supra note 28, at 72.

THE FEDERALIST

RECORDS OF

THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

250.

CORWIN,

251.
17 U.S. 316 (1819); see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, Boston University School of Law, (Working Paper Series, Public
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 03-11, 2003), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
delivery.cfmISSRNID410542_code030527570.pdf?abstractid=410542 (last visited Mar. 28,

2004).
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id.
Statements of James Wilson, supra note 248, at 506.
Id.
He stated:

In England, if the king and his ministers find themselves, during their negotiation,
to be embarrassed because an existing law is not repealed or a new law is not enacted, they give notice to the legislature of their situation, and inform them that it
will be necessary, before the treaty can operate, that some law be repealed or some
be made. And will not the same thing take place here?
Id. at 506-07.
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A point that is almost missed is that implementing legislation is al256
ready a narrowing of the treaty power. This doctrinal creation gives the
House of Representatives a role that the Framers denied it,2 7 by making
the commitments of treaties the law of the land. Consider the following.
If Congress had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights as self-executing, a citizen aggrieved by one of its guarantees, say
sex discrimination, if such grievance amounted to a violation of the
Covenant, would have had a direct cause of action either against a state,
the United States, or an individual, as the case may be. 21 The federal
courts would have jurisdiction over this cause of action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and would be required to adjudicate the merits of the
claim based on the treaty provision.
Alternatively, the result ought not to be different if the treaty is nonself-executing and Congress has chosen to pass implementing legislation. If the hypothetical victim now chose to proceed under VAWA's civil
remedy provision, it is unclear why what is considered a plenary power
in the case above, would be rendered incomplete, narrowed, and balanced against a state prerogative as a result of a political decision to
implement an international obligation piece-by-piece, rather than in its
entirety. In the absence of a doctrine of non-self-execution, history, practice, and doctrine confirm, Congress ought to be able to meet our
international obligations through any proper means, unimpeded by abstract notions of federalism of recent vintage. The result should be no
different when the treaty-makers choose to proceed with caution.
So what does it mean for a treaty implementing statute to be consistent with the Constitution? It means that a treaty that contravenes any of
the specific injunctions of the Constitution, such as the Bill of Rights,
would be invalid as a matter of domestic law. 259 And it means no more
than that. The United States should have the legislative capacity to bring
its internal affairs into compliance with its international obligations to
the same extent that it demands such compliance from other nations. At
the very least, the treaty power should permit Congress to adapt our laws
to the changing exigencies of our international relations. 6
Passing a national response to clusters of problematic state laws is
an appropriate response to the obligations imposed under the Covenant.
256.
Henkin, supra note 10, at 346 (stating that the requirement of non-self-execution
the United States attaches to most human rights treaties may be unconstitutional as the Framers envisioned the treaty making power complete in itself).
257.
Id. at 347.
258.
See discussion, supra notes 232-42 and accompanying text.
259.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 302(2) cmt. b, Reporter's Note 1 (1987); see also HistoricalFoundations,supra note
17, at 1083.
260.
CORWIN, supra note 28, at 19.
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There is no requirement that there be a showing of actual discrimination
before the United States can take proactive action to "ensure" that effective remedies exist for discriminatory conduct as defined under the
Covenant. It makes no sense to require abusive action before a legislative
response is deemed constitutionally appropriate under the treaty power.
But this is the result that a federalism-encumbered treaty clause would
yield.
If first principles federalism encumbers the treaty-makers' power and
discretion to enact legislation pursuant to the treaty power, then the doctrine of non-self-execution must give way. That is, it is inconceivable
that the United States would lack the power to enter into treaties because
of state prerogatives. Was this not the reason the Articles of Confederation failed? If self-execution is not the default rule, and treaties are
supreme pursuant to Article VI, 6 ' then the doctrine of non-self-execution
ought not to incorporate into its doctrinal arsenal federalism limitations
conceived to address an entirely different structural concern.
II.

THE TREATY POWER AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM

A. The Treaty Power
Federalism has always been a paradox, and not least in the context
of the treaty power. In 1789, Federalists and Anti-Federalists, armed with
lessons acquired under the Articles of Confederation, disagreed as to
which body should possess this most important power-although they
agreed that it should not be located within the states.262 Even though the
treaty clause was a plenary delegation of national power, one thought to
inhere in national sovereignty, concerns about the role of and the impact
on states permeated the constitutional debates with frequency, and often
with insistence.2 63 The concerns, however, centered not on how much
power the states would have to cede, for it was understood that they retained none in this area, but on what the federal government could attain
under such a broad power.

See Treaties, supra note 31. Professor Vdzquez ably explains the reasons treaties
261.
should become the law of the land at the moment of ratification. "The Supremacy Clause
provides that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." No interpretation is necessary to conclude that
this clause purports to give "all" treaties the status of domestic law." Id. at 2169.
For Framers' discussions and understandings, see infra notes 265-76, 280-88 and
262.
accompanying text.
263.
Id.
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For the Framers, the power of the new government to conduct foreign affairs was fundamentally a problem of federalism.M Under the
Articles of Confederation the Continental Congress was powerless to
force the states to honor the international obligations assumed on behalf
of the whole under the Treaty of Paris.265 Contemptuous of the British
and defiant in their refusal to repay revolutionary war debts, the states
provoked a crisis of unity and of international credibility, both of which
threatened the survival of the emergent United States. This state of affairs, as is well known, was a catalyst for the Philadelphia Convention
and the need to revise the Articles of Confederation.
The initial focus of the convention was not to enact a new
Constitution. Rather, it was to devise an effective method to bring
resistant states into compliance with assumed international obligations.2 6
Although Congress had the power to make treaties under the Articles of
Confederation, 267. it lacked the coercive power over the states necessary to
sustain its credibility with foreign nations268 and to act with "one voice."
This deficiency led James Madison and John Jay to reject all state
autonomy over foreign affairs under the new government. 69 James
264.
Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle: The Treatymaking Clause As A
Case Study, in 1 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 233, 236 (1984) [hereinafter Solving a
Constitutional Puzzle]; see also JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS:

AN

INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

333-400 (1979) (explaining

that the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation in the area of foreign relations was a
major motivation for calling the Constitutional Convention).
265.
Treaty of Paris, Sept. 3, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, 8 Stat. 80, 82. State refusal to
abide by the Treaty of Paris was a serious matter. Several states had enacted legislation confiscating or discharging debts owed to British Creditors. Britain wanted these repealed as a
condition to continued adherence to the Treaty. Britain had also requested that Loyalists be
permitted to return after the war, a request with which numerous states, including New York
and Virginia, refused to comply. As a result of state noncompliance, Britain ultimately refused
to surrender military posts in the territories, an action it promised it would carry through. See
Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of ExtraconstitutionalForeignAffairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 379, 422-23 (2000).
266.
See, e.g., Solving a ConstitutionalPuzzle, supra note 264, at 236; see also Harold
G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 832
(1989) (stating that one of the main reasons for calling a constitutional convention was to
address the problems arising from state autonomy); Historical Foundations, supra note 17, at
1102.
267.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, arts. VI, IX (1778).
268.
See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.

1617, 1643-44 (1997).
269.
See, e.g., I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 316 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]. The Journal of June 19, 1787,

REV.

sets forth James Madison's preoccupation regarding state non-compliance with international
obligations:
The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs. contain complaints already, from almost every nation
with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn us. This
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Madison thought that the foreign affairs power "forms an obvious and
essential branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation
in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. 270 The
"one-voice" political imperative justified, in Madison's view, a "general
government" monopoly over foreign affairs. 7 Whatever may be said
about dual-federalism in other areas of congressional power, the "one
nation" objective implies a rejection of a dual-federalism structure in this
realm.
To be sure, state noninterference in foreign policy 27 2 was of urgent
significance to the drafters. This concern led the treaty power to be
lodged exclusively in the federal government, just as it was explicitly
denied to the states. 3 states were forbidden from entering "into any
treaty, alliance, or confederation, 274 or "any agreement or compact with
another state, or with a foreign power,' ' 171 without congressional consent.
The House was excluded from the treaty process because it was viewed
as an unsuitable body for negotiation, given its sheer size, and because of
concerns over secrecy and expediency. 276
As an initial matter, then, it is but a truism that the treaty power was,
since its inception, expansive and textually complete in its allocation.
But it is as descriptively unhelpful to say that the Framers perceived the
treaty power as broad, as it is to say that federalism refers to a political
structure in which the states and the federal government share power.
This recognition only begs the question, for it is its very breadth that is at
the root of disagreements.

cannot be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers
is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring [calamities] on the
whole.
Id. John Jay stated that "as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and of the laws
of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of
the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
270.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
271.
Id.
272.
See, e.g., RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 269.
273.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
274.
Id.
275.
Id. cl. 3.
276.
See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION OF PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 280-82 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) (1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES]
(comments of Pinckney in the South Carolina ratifying convention).
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B. The Textual Basis: Its Meaning Along Historical,
Doctrinal,and Theoretical Dimensions

The treaty power is set forth in three provisions of the Constitution:
Article II, Section 2 gives the President "power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.'

277

Article VI states that "all treaties made, or

which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the Land. 278 In turn, Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power to make all laws "necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States. ' 279 These three clauses
form the constitutional foundation for the principle that Congress may
legislate to implement provisions of a treaty.2 0 What this text meant to
accomplish, as well as what it has evolved to signify, can be captured
along three dimensions: history, doctrine, and theory.
1. Historical Deliberations
Discussions in many of the state ratifying conventions indicate that
the Framers had no problem in agreeing that the proposed text was plenary and potentially far-reaching. The Framers' disagreements concerned
what the federal government could accomplish under such expansive
power. In the North Carolina convention, which rejected the Constitution, deliberations centered on the objection that the proposed treaty
power was so broad as to permit the new government to cede the territories and rivers of the states.28 ' To this concern, one early commentator
responded: "This question of the right of the treaty-making power to
cede territory is wholly a political question, and when, if ever, it arises
for determination, it will necessarily be determined upon wholly political
considerations. 282 Burr acknowledged that ceding of territory was a political question and accordingly a matter that would be decided "upon

277.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
278.
Id. art. VI, cl.
2.
279.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
280.
Certainly, none of these provisions address implementing legislation. They are
focused solely on the power to enact treaties, whom this power is deposited in, how a treaty is
ratified, and the declaration that once it is, it becomes the law of the land. The bi-cameral
power for treaty-implementing legislation is derivative of the treaty power itself, is necessitated by the doctrine of non-self-execution, and is grounded on the Necessary and Proper
Clause.
281.
CORWIN, supra note 28, at 66 (citing statement of Mr. Porter in the North Carolina
Ratifying Convention).
282.

Burr, supra note 28, at 301.
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wholly political considerations.,823 But this, according to Justice White,
was not justified if the argument meant that the federal government
could simply sell a state:
True, from the exigency of a calamitous war or the necessity of a
settlement of boundaries, it may be that citizens of the United
States may be expatriated by the action of the treaty-making
power, impliedly or expressly ratified by Congress. But the arising of these particular conditions cannot justify the general
proposition that territory which is an integral part of the United
States may, as a mere act of sale, be disposed of.2 4
Similar concerns were expressed in the Virginia ratifying convention, where there was much opposition to the breadth of the treaty power
because of fears that it could be used to dismember the union. Madison
and Randolph's response to these objections was that the new government would not exercise its power in a manner to destroy the union it
was charged with protecting:"' Madison, pointing out that the treaty
power under the Constitution was to be the same as that under the Articles of Confederation, inquired:
Does it follow, because this power is given to Congress, that it is
absolute and unlimited? I do not conceive that power is given to
the President and Senate to dismember the Empire or to alienate
any great essential right. I do not think the whole legislative authority have this power. The exercise of the power must be
consistent with the object of the delegation ... The object of

treaties is the regulation of intercourse with foreign nations, and
is external. I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases
in which such external regulations would be necessary. Would it
be right to define all the cases in which Congress could exercise
this authority? The definition might and probably would prove
defective. They might be restrained by such a definition, from
exercising the authority where it would be essential to the interest and safety of the community. It is most safe, therefore, to
leave it to be exercised as contingencies arise. 6
The explanation Madison offered was thus not one of limiting the
scope of the power itself, but a defense of its very expansiveness as
283.
Id.
284.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 317 (1901) (White, J. concurring).
285.
See CORWIN, supra note 28, at 70.
286.
Id. at 70-71; see also 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 276, at 512-16 (setting forth
exchanges between Patrick Henry and James Madison on the potential unlimited scope of the
treaty power.)
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necessary to accomplish the objectives for which it was enacted. Short of
destruction of the union, Madison believed the treaty power did not, and
in fact should not, have any pre-established or enumerated limits.
John Calhoun, no ardent supporter of a strong federal government,
agreed with Madison's understanding. Although he believed that the legislative power ought to have expressly delineated limits, which he
thought essential to preserving co-existing state powers, the treaty
power, in his opinion, should have none. Calhoun believed that when the
country's relation with the world was implicated, "the states disappear.
Divided within, we present the exterior of undivided sovereignty. The
wisdom of the constitution, in this, appears conspicuous."2"7 He believed
that imposing an enumerated list for the exercise of this power was "vain
and pernicious... Whatever, then, concerns our foreign relations; whatever requires the consent of another nation, belongs to the treaty-making
power ' 288 and it with the federal government.
Others emphasized that while enumeration was appropriate for Article I, because states retained some quantum of undelegated authority, the
treaty power was not, and should not, be subject to the intervention,
"consent or fiat of state legislatures. It derives its obligation from its being a compact between the sovereign of this, and the sovereign of
another nation.' '289 George Mason, an opponent of the Constitution,
stated:
By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the Executive
and the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation; which might have been avoided by proper distinctions
with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of
Representatives, where it could be done with safety.29
Nowhere in the records of the Convention or anywhere else is there
evidence that anyone disagreed with Mason, who spoke often and vigorously, on the meaning of the Treaty Clause.2 9' In the federal convention,
for example, it was acknowledged that because the Senate represented
the sovereignty of the states, whatever decisions this body made in pur292
suance of the treaty power must safely be left to it.
It was understood
287.

2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 132 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1854).
Id.
Letter from British Minister Carmathen to John Adams (Feb. 28, 1786), in 4 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 187, 203-204 (1820), quoted in
HistoricalFoundations,supra note 17, at 1126.
290.
Burr, supra note 28, at 308 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 260, at 639).
291.
Id.
292.
CORWIN, supra note 28, at 67 (citing statement by Davie, a North Carolina delegate
288.
289.

to the Federal Convention).
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and accepted that states' interests would be adequately represented by
requiring a two-thirds supermajority for the conclusion of treaties. This,
the Framers believed, was the extent of the concern for state prerogatives.
A singular, emphatic voice disagreed. Jefferson commented that the
treaty power was:
confined to two branches only of the ordinary legislature, the
President originating and the Senate having a negative. To what
subjects this power extends has not been defined in detail by the
Constitution nor are we entirely agreed among ourselves. (1) It
is admitted that it must concern the foreign nation, party to the
contract ...(2) By the general power to make treaties, the constitution must have intended to comprehend only those objects
which are usually regulated by treaty, and cannot be otherwise
regulated. (3) It must have meant to except out of these the
rights reserved to the states: for surely the President and Senate
cannot do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted
from doing in any way. (4) And also to except those subjects of
legislation in which it gave a participation to the House of Representatives. This last is denied by some, on the ground that it
would leave very little matter for the treaty-power to work on.
The less the better, say others.293
Commentators rely on Jefferson's statements in his Manual of Parliamentary Practice to support the proposition that federalism limits were
not only considered, but also widely shared. The problem with relying
on Jefferson's argument alone, while ignoring other commentaries is
obvious. Aside from that, some commentators have unequivocally stated
that Jefferson's arguments run counter to history and doctrine and "have
been consistently rejected."2' 94 For purposes of this discussion, it is unimportant who is correct in the interpretation of what history has to offer on
this issue. What the disagreement does reflect, however, is that a conclusion supporting a normative view of pro-federalism limits is not selfevident.
293.
Id. at 122; see also Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of ParliamentaryPractice:For the
Use of the Senate of the United States, in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGs 353, 420
(Wilbur Samuel Howell ed., 1988); HENKIN, supra note 230, at 189. But see William E.
Mikell, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power of the President and Senate of the United

States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 435, 528, 535 (1909) (serving as an example of earlier commentators who explained Jefferson's concerns as being consistent with the structural limitations of
the Constitution).
294.

Brucke Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.

801, 813 (1995).
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Unlike Jefferson, John Calhoun-also a strong state rights' advocate-believed federalism had no function in constraining the treaty
power. The rationale for this belief, "'is to be found in the fact that the
treaty-making power is vested exclusively in the Government of the
United States; and therefore nothing more was necessary in delegating it
than to specify as is done, the portion or department of the Government
in which it is vested ..., ,,295 He did recognize that the treaty power was
limited, in the manner in which power is generally limited. But this limitation, he believed, was not one focused on state prerogatives. 296 Thus,
Calhoun believed the power was: (1) limited to questions proper for negotiation between the United States and foreign powers, (2) limited by
the express prohibitions of the Constitution, and (3) limited in a way that
would prevent the federal government from changing the character of the
union,
or to do that which can only be done by the constitution-making
power; or which is inconsistent with the nature and structure of
the government, or the objects for which it was formed. Among
which it seems to be settled that it cannot change or alter the
boundary of a state or cede any portion of its territory without its
consent. Within these limits all questions which may arise between us and other powers, be the subject-matter what it may,
fall within the
limits of the treaty-making power and may be ad297
it.
by
justed
The Framers thus considered the role of the states in the treatymaking process (perhaps we can label this the "federalism concern,")
and reached a compromise resulting in Article II. There is no historical
justification further to qualify the treaty power with the radiations emanating from the Tenth Amendment.
Unlike federalism limitations, the issue of subject-matter limitation
was addressed in constitutional debates,298 as well as by early observers.299 But these discussions centered on what was of national concern
295.
CORWIN, supra note 28, at 158 (quoting JOHN C. CALHOUN, DISCOURSE ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 202-04 (1855)).
2 THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, supra note 287, at 132.
CORWIN, supra note 28, at 159.
See 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 276, at 512-16 (setting forth exchanges between
Patrick Henry and James Madison on the potential unlimited scope of the treaty power).
Madison stated: "I do not think it possible to enumerate all the cases in which such external
regulations would be necessary. Would it be right to define all the cases in which Congress
could exercise this authority? The definition might, and probably would, be defective." Id. at
514-15.
299.
See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, Speech on the Bill to regulatethe commerce between the
United States and Great Britain, according to the Convention of the 3d of July, 1815 (Jan. 9,
1816), John C. Calhoun, Speech in the Commercial Convention with Great Britain (Jan. 9,
296.

297.
298.
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versus what was international and thus the proper subject of negotiation
with other nations. The original understanding of this subject-matter
limitation is no longer illustratively useful,3°° nor can it help advance the
discourse on limits that ought to exist to constrain the treaty power.
An essential premise in this understanding is that the original conceptualization of the treaty power has lost its descriptive value.
Dichotomized, as it was, between the national and the international, the
Framers' sense of the objectives the power was to serve is a precarious
basis for defining the ends it ought to serve in today's fluid and richly
compromised reality. In other words, the lens of history, as well as of
precedent-isolated from other considerations-has shown to be stunningly ill equipped to inform a 21st century problem by extrapolating
categorical principles from an 18th century background. 1 Indeed, although the Supreme Court embraced the originalist view in several treaty
cases, 302 the American Law Institute, after having adopted it in the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, rejected it in the Third.3 3

1816), CORWIN, supra note 28, at 70-71 (quoting James Madison in suggesting that there
cannot be useful subject-matter limitations to the treaty power); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 185-189 (2d ed. 1996); JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1503, at 356 (1833) ("It is difficult to circumscribe the power within any definite limits, applicable to all times and exigencies, without
impairing its efficacy, or defeating its purposes. The Constitution has, therefore, made it general and unqualified."). JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1503, at 356 (1833) ("It is difficult to circumscribe the power within any
definite limits, applicable to all times and exigencies, without impairing its efficacy, or defeating its purposes. The constitution has, therefore, made it general and unqualified"); in 2 THE
WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 123, 132-33 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1864).
300.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 302 cmt. c (1987) ("[T]he Constitution does not require that an international agreement deal only with "matters of international concern."").
301.
This is not to say that history is irrelevant, of course, nor that intuitive structural
arguments by appealing to Framers' intent are an ineffectual method of clarifying the modem
scope of the treaty power. But it is to say that it cannot be the only method.
See, e.g., Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (holding that the power to
302.
enter into treaties is limited to "all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and
other nations"); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (stating that treaty power extends
only to concerns "properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country"); Holden v. Joy,
84 U.S. 211, 243 (1872) (stating that the treaty power extends to "all those object which in the
intercourse of nations had usually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and
treaty").
303.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 117(1) (1965) ("The United States has the power under the Constitution to make
international agreement if ...the matter is of international concern."), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 302 cmt. c (1987) ("Contrary to what was once suggested, the Constitution does not require that an international
agreement deal only with 'matters of international concern.' ")
STATES,
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2. Doctrinal Understandings
The most important case to address the power of Congress to domes3
ticate treaties free of federalism limitations is Missouri v. Holland.1
Although it was not the first to consider the scope of the treaty power, it
was the vanguard in establishing the proposition that is the subject of
current academic attack, the power of Congress to legislate pursuant to a
treaty, even in areas falling outside of its Article I powers. Because of its
central role in this discussion, it is important to analyze the case at some
length.
The Migratory Bird Act0 5 at issue in Holland had been struck down
by two federal district courts as falling outside an explicit congressional
power.3°6 The Shauver court expressed the familiar principle that our
government is one of limited and enumerated powers and thus Congress
can only legislate in an area for which it has authority.3°7 Similarly, the
court noted, "as to all internal affairs the states retained their police
power, which they, as sovereign nations, possessed prior to the adoption
of the national Constitution, and no such powers were granted to the nation. ' ' The court added that the Tenth Amendment prohibited Congress
from legislating for general welfare. 3°9 The government had also defended the Migratory Bird Act on the theory that no single state could
regulate for all, thus requiring Congress to act.3" ° The court rejected this
argument and reasoned that birds were not the property of the United
States, and thus it could not regulate them.3 '
After these decisions, the United States entered into a treaty with
Great Britain signing on behalf of Canada's territory for the protection of
migratory birds. Both governments agreed to enact "necessary measures for insuring the execution of' the Treaty."3 The implementing
304.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
305.
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (July 3, 1918), ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 703-712 (1994)).
306.
See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). In McCullagh, the
federal government defended the statute under the Commerce Clause and the General Welfare
Clause. See also United States v. Shauver, 214 E 154, 156 (E.D. Ark. 1914). In Shauver, the
government argued that the statute was valid legislation under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2
of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States ......
307.
Shauver, 214 F. at 156.
308.
Id.
309.
Id. at 157.
310.
Id.
311.
Id.
312.
Convention with Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702.
313.
Id. art. 8, 39 Stat. at 1704.
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legislation resulting from this Treaty, as well as the Treaty itself, were
attacked in the United States Supreme Court.314 Missouri sought an injunction preventing the enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of
1918 and its implementing regulations." 5 It claimed that the Act was an
unconstitutional interference with its sovereign rights under the Tenth
Amendment because it claimed a proprietary right over all birds within
its borders.3 6
Justice Holmes rejected Missouri's contention that it exercised authority over birds within its territory, because no one possessed wild
birds, possession being an essential element of ownership.3 7 Rather, the
protection of these birds was "a national interest of very nearly the first
magnitude" which "can be protected only by national action in concert
' He stated that "[b]ut
with that of another power."318
for the treaty and the
statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with."319 The
argument followed, that if the treaty was valid, there could be no doubt
that Congress could enact implementing legislation pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause.320 Consequently, concluded Justice Holmes,
implementing legislation is a valid exercise of congressional power,
notwithstanding any claimed sovereign rights that may exist under the
Tenth Amendment. 2 ' The Court explicitly rejected the argument that
"what an act of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the
powers reserved to the states, a treaty cannot do."3 22 Rather, "[i]t is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well
being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by
such an act could."323 Thus the treaty power is complete in its allocation
and Congress need not rely on an explicit Article I power to reach a
proper subject within its realm.
No Supreme Court case has ever challenged Holland's
understanding of the scope of implementing legislation and the
irrelevance of the Tenth Amendment in limiting its reach. Rather, this
understanding has been reaffirmed, even in a case that struck down an
executive agreement as unconstitutional. In Reid v. Covert, 24 the Court
considered whether Congress had the power to expose civilians to trial
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 433.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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before a military tribunal without the protections of the Bill of Rights
and concluded that it did not. Mrs. Covert had killed her husband, a
sergeant in the Air Force, at an airbase in England. She was courtmartialed for murder under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and
was convicted of murder.3 25 She sought a writ of habeas corpus
contending that it was unconstitutional for the Air Force to try her in a
military tribunal.3 6 The Court accepted her argument and held that the
327
Constitution required that civilians be tried in civil courts.
The government had argued that the trial before the military tribunal
was necessary and proper for compliance with obligations assumed under an executive agreement in effect with Great Britain. 328 This
agreement permitted the United States to exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over all offenses committed by American servicemen and their dependents on British soil. 329 The Court rejected this argument because "no

agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on
any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.

'33 0

The Court rejected the argument that the Supremacy

Clause implied that treaties did not have to comply with the explicit provisions of the Constitution. It noted that nothing in the history of its
adoption suggested the interpretation proposed by the government.
Rather,
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible
for the Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire constitutional
history and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the
United States to exercise power under an international agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect,
such construction would permit amendment of that document in
a manner not sanctioned by Article V. The prohibitions of the
Constitution were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive
or by the Executive and the Senate combined.33'
The Reid Court noted that Missouri v. Holland was not inconsistent
with its holding. In Holland there was no conflict with any provision of
the Constitution, as was the case in Reid. And the holding in Holland,
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 16.

Id.
Id. at 17 (citation omitted).
Id. at 16-17.
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finding the Tenth Amendment to be no impediment to the treaty power,
stands: "To the extent that the United States can validly make treaties,
the people and the states have delegated their power to the National
Government and the Tenth Amendment is no barrier.'33 2 The Court reaffirmed the role of the Necessary and Proper Clause as a permissible
vehicle for carrying into execution implied powers.333
Other significant cases focused on two issues: (1) the treaty-makers'
prerogatives to negotiate with foreign nations on any matter deemed
suitable for such negotiation, and (2) the necessity for conflicting state
laws or policies to yield to ratified treaties. In the much criticized decision of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp,3" for example,
Justice Sutherland stated in dictum that states never possessed any sovereignty in the international sense of the word and concluded that all
foreign affairs powers were vested exclusively in the federal government
' The
"as necessary concomitants of nationality."335
Court has also expressed the understanding that states, upon ratifying the Constitution,
ceded exclusive authority over foreign affairs to the federal government.336
In United States v. Belmont, 37 the Court struck down New York's bid
to thwart several agreements negotiated by the United States in recognition of the Soviet Union. The Court sweepingly dismissed any potential
interest New York may have had in its efforts, "since [the Court was] of
the opinion that no state policy can prevail against the international
compact here involved.""33 It stated, "Plainly, the external powers of the
United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies."339 To permit states to dictate or interfere in foreign policy would

332.
Id. at 18 (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124-25 (1941)).
Id. at 20-22.
333.
334.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1936). This case
addressed the validity of a congressional resolution granting President Roosevelt the power to
prohibit the sale of arms to countries involved in a South American conflict. Relying on this
resolution, the President declared any sales of arms illegal. The Curtiss-Wright Corporation
was indicted for violating the order. The Supreme Court held delegation of power to Roosevelt
constitutional. The decision has been severely criticized for its historical inaccuracies and
theoretical untenability. See Raoul Berger, The PresidentialMonopoly of Foreign Relations,
71 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (1972); Federalism 1, supra note 17, at 437; Globalism and the
Constitution, supra note 17, at 2020 n.310; Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. CurtissWright Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
335.
299 U.S. 304 at 318.
336.
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 550 (1840) ("The states, by the adoption of the
existing Constitution, have become divested of all their national attributes, except such as
relate purely to their internal concerns.").
337.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
338.
Id. at 327.
339.
Id. at 331.
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result in a "charge of national perfidy, and involve us in war."3'40 The foreign affairs power, therefore, cannot be subject to any limitations on
account of the states, 4 ' especially in cases of preemption.
This concern of prohibiting the states from rewriting the United
States' foreign policy was echoed in United States v. Pink.4 2 The Court
reiterated that states play no role in the foreign affairs power. Rather, this
power is vested in the national government exclusively, and it need not
defer or conform to state laws or policies. To be sure, the Court emphasized, whatever state policy may be implicated is wholly irrelevant to the
judicial inquiry when the United States acts in its plenary and constitutional capacity to enforce its foreign policy in the courts of the union. 34'
This understanding goes as far back as interpretations of the Treaty
of Paris in conflict with state property laws. The Court's first significant
decision in this area invalidated a Virginia statute that conflicted with the
1783 Treaty of Paris by canceling debts owed to British citizens.3 4 Justice Chase, writing for the majority, reaffirmed that under the Supremacy
Clause, treaties are the supreme law of the land and any conflicting state
statutes must give way to the superiority of federal law.3 45 The Court has
repeatedly invalidated state legislation as inconsistent with treaty provisions in subjects such as statutes of limitations, 346 confiscation,3 7 and
escheat of land.34 8
Modern examples of courts' deference to the treaty power are consistent with 200 years of doctrinal precedent. One such example is

340.
Id. (quoting James Madison in 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 267, at 515).
341.
Id.
342.
315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942) (holding that an executive agreement with Russia
preempted contrary state property laws).
343.
Id.
344.
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 237 (1796).
345.
Id.; see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), where the Supreme Court considered the propriety of Congress's use of the Necessary and Proper Clause in enacting a
statute to implement certain provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Congress had enacted an extradition statute authorizing any United States court to hold probable cause hearings for persons
charged with crimes committed in another country and to issue, upon request of the offended
country, a surrender order. Id. at 110-11. The Court held:
The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution as well the powers enumerated in Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution,
as all others vested in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
the officers thereof, includes the power to enact such legislation as is appropriate to
give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with a foreign power.
Id. at 121.
346.
See Hopkirk v. Bell, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 454 (1806).
347.
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
348.
See Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340 (1901).
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United States v. Lue.349 President Reagan had proposed legislation designed to implement the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages."' The Convention required signatory parties to take specific
steps to adopt "effective measures for the prevention, prosecution and
punishment of all acts of taking of hostages as manifestations of international terrorism."35' Pursuant to its obligations under the Hostage Taking
Convention, Congress passed the Hostage Taking Act.35
Lue was convicted under the Hostage Taking Act353 for attempting to
abduct and hold a victim hostage for a ransom. He thus challenged the
statute as unconstitutional under United States v. Lopez, which had held
that Congress lacked the power to regulate purely local activities, particularly in areas such as education and crime.354 He contended that the
Act exceeded Congress's Article I powers as set forth in Lopez, and that
it violated principles of federalism secured under the Tenth Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.355 He also argued that the treaty itself exceeded the treaty power as it regulated purely
domestic matters not touching on relations with other nations.3 6
The federal appeals court upheld the validity of the Act based on
Congress's treaty power, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the authority of Holland.357 The court held that the "proper subject of
negotiation" between the United States and other nations is not the province of the judiciary to define. Rather, in foreign affairs, the prerogative
belongs to the Executive.358 The court stated:
International law knows no limitations on the purpose or subject
matter of international agreements, other than they may not
349.
350.

134 F.3d 79 (2nd Cir. 1998).
Id. at 81. The signatory parties to the Convention agreed that:

Any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to continue to
detain another person ... in order to compel a third party, namely, a state ... to do
or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of
the hostage commits the offence of taking of hostages ... within the meaning of

this Convention.
International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, adopted Dec. 17, 1979, art. 1,
T.I.A.S. 11,081, 11,083, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205,207 [hereinafter Hostage Taking Convention].
351.
Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 350, at 206.
352.
Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, Pub. L. No.
98-473, Title II, ch. XX,pt. A, § 2002(a), 98 Stat. 2186 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1203 (West
2000)).
353.
Id.
354.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
355.
134 E3dat 81.
356.
Id. at 82.

357.

Id. at 81.

358.

Id. at 83.
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conflict with a peremptory norm of international law. states may
enter into an agreement on any matter of concern to them, and
international law does not look behind their motives or purposes
in doing so. Thus, the United States may make an agreement on
any subject suggested by its national interests in relations with
other nations.359
Thus whatever outer limits there may be to the treaty making power, the
Hostage Convention does not transgress that limit.36° If the Hostage Taking
Convention was a valid exercise of the treaty power, then there was little
3 61
room to argue that implementing legislation was not necessary and proper.
Similarly, In Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources,3 62 a federal district court upheld the constitutionality of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973363 as valid implementing legislation 364 for
the Convention for the Protection of Migratory and Endangered Birds365
and the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere.3"" The court relied on Holland and the treaty power
as well as the Necessary and Proper Clause to uphold the statute.367
Most recently, the validity of the NAFTA Implementation Act368 was
challenged.3 69 Plaintiff union members challenged the constitutionality of
NAFTA and of the Implementation Act as exceeding Congress's treaty
powers. The court held that both the treaty and its implementing legislation were constitutional. 370 The Supreme Court denied certiorari."37'
359.
Id (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 302 cmt. a (1986)).
360.
Id at 84.
Id.
361.
362.
471 E Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
363.
Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1993) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994)).
471 F Supp. at 994.
364.
365.
Convention for the Protection of Migratory and Endangered Birds, March 4, 1972, U.S.Japan, 25 U.S.T. 3329.
366.
Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere,
openedfor signature Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 193.
367.
471 F Supp. at 994.
368.
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473).
369.
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F Supp.2d. 1226, 1229 (N.D. Ala. 1999),
vacated by 242 F3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001).
370.
56 E Supp.2d, at 1322-23. For an in-depth discussion of the constitutionality of NAFrA,
see David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1791 (1998); see also
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 294 at 805 n. 12; but cf Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L.
REv. 1221 (1995) (criticizing Professors Ackerman and Golove on the constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES

§ 303(2) cmt. e (1987).

Made in the USA Foundation v. U.S., 242 F3d 1300 (11 th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
371.
534 U.S. 1039 (2001).
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The point of this laundry-listing of doctrinal understandings is to
underscore that established doctrine has never seen fit to incorporate
federalism limits, as may be abstractly and implicitly derived from the
Tenth Amendment, as a formal or proper limitation to the treaty power,
including the power of Congress to enact implementing legislation that
may fall outside of its Article I powers. The answer to the Holland caveat cannot be found in history or doctrine, though either one can
support a normative argument for the overruling of its holding. It is important to note, however, that this result is anything but compelled.
3. Theoretical Propositions
The normative proposition that there ought to be some form of limitation to the treaty power should rest on a recognizable principle of
constitutionalism. History offers very little in this realm, notwithstanding
the Herculean efforts of some commentators arguing to the contrary.372 If
we determine that that there exists some form of limitation on the treaty
power, then what principled standard are we going to adopt that limits
that power in line with the demands of the Constitution?
As a matter of political theory, the prior question is why such a normative limitation should exist at all. That ours is a government of limited
and enumerated powers, with reserved powers belonging to the states, is
an unsatisfactory basis on which to ground the case against a treaty
power "exceptionalism." To be sure, it cannot, standing alone, serve as a
constitutional foundation. That powers of the federal government are
limited says nothing about the nature of the limitation on a field that as
established by text, history, and doctrine, is within the exclusive control
of the President and the Senate.
The problem of federalism in the context of domestic legislation
emerges when the structural guarantees to the states are interrupted by
implementing domestic legislation that reaches areas, in first principles
federalism's lexicon, that were previously reserved to the states. 373 But as
an initial matter, if state laws that interfere with foreign policy are invalid, then it is difficult to see why a plenary constitutional power should
372.
See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 17, at 675; James Deeken, A New
Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that
Place Affirmative Obligations on state Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 997 (1998); Federalism I, supra note 17, at 456; Globalism and the
Constitution,supra note 17.
373.
As has been widely argued, principled federalism categories of "inherent" state
sovereignty are as difficult to define as they are to defend, much less to apply through a coherent theory consistent with rule-of-law values.
374.
See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (holding that an executive
agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union preempted a New York property
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be limited by structural federalism limitations. There is nothing in Article II, or within the understood scope of presidential powers, that limits
the President's ability to negotiate a treaty on virtually any subject he
considers proper to raise with a foreign nation."' And there is no structural ban on the Senate giving its advice and consent to the treaty
proposed by the President. In my view, it would be structurally incoherent, as well as contrary to history and doctrine, to impose an
"enumerated powers limitation" to the negotiations and implementations
of treaties.
An enumerated-powers limitation, under which category first principles federalism falls, would have to involve the Court in micromanaging
this country's foreign affairs, a task it is spectacularly ill suited to undertake. Moreover, to the extent judicial federalism would justify umpiring
the national versus the international, in the same manner it has umpired
the local versus the national, it is difficult to conceive of a judicial intervention that is not inappropriately intrusive on the prerogatives of the
treaty-makers. Should the Court unfortunately choose to undertake this
task, one which it has prudentially so far refused to take on, serious separation of powers problems would ensue and the Court would be
positioned selectively to reject or accept the commitments we have made
with other nations. The implications stemming from this institutional
arrangement are too eccentric to fathom.
Some commentators argue that such limitations are necessary because the lack of federalism limits simply cedes too much power to
Congress, while denying a proper role for the states. But this is a disagreement with the Constitution itself: the states have no role in this
process, historically, doctrinally, or otherwise. Moreover, that a lack of
federalism restrictions on the treaty power would leave the treaty-makers
to do what they wish proves too much. It ignores the inherent complexities of the treaty-making process itself, as well as the dynamics of
ratification.
First, it assumes that the President and the Senate act as a monolith,
that they might conspire or collude not only with one another, but with
other nations for the sole purpose of entering into international agreements that would enable domestic legislation otherwise impermissible;
that is, they enter into what Professor Henkin has termed a "mock marriage. 3 7 6 It also assumes that treaty-makers will disregard our foreign

law); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) (striking down a California law that restricted
Chinese immigration); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 271-72 (1817) (invalidating
a Maryland law that conflicted with the provisions of a treaty with France).
375.
See Am. Insurance Assn. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 2374(2003).
376.
HENKIN, supra note 230, at 185.
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policy implications in the process. These assumptions say more about
human nature than they do about the treaty power37 7 and nothing about
constitutional requirements.
To illustrate the point, the type of consensus that would be required
for an egregious usurpation of power to take place, of the type neofederalism proponents worry about, is simply unrealistic. If the goal of
an entirely cohesive Congress were to interfere with state prerogatives
for the sake of regulating all matters which it lacks the power to regulate
under Article I, a series of episodes must take place. First, a cohesive and
agreeable Congress would have to convince the President to negotiate a
treaty of the type addressing matters that it wants to regulate. Assuming
that the President goes along with this proposal, then in deference to the
congressional request, he must find a nation or nations willing to enter
into this international agreement and to bind themselves by its provisions. Assuming that a recognized state under international law willingly
enters into this agreement with the United States, then the President must
seek two-thirds consent of the Senate to ratify the treaty. This consent
should be readily forthcoming, as we are operating under the assumption
that the whole of Congress was able to persuade the President in the first
instance.
Assuming the Senate gives its consent, the treaty, if self-executing,
becomes the law of the land. If not, then implementing legislation will
be required. This second step should also not be a problem for the same
reason that consent was not. Now there exists a self-executing treaty,
with the status of domestic law, operating to interfere with undefined
state prerogatives. Allow me to suggest that if this scenario were ever to
take place, perhaps we should think seriously about our capacity as voters, rather than focus on creating a broad constitutional principle for all
times.
Moreover, if the treaty power is ever used by Congress to create unprecedented domestic legislation, it will be not as a result of the
unbounded scope of the power itself, but would pursue from the
Rehnquist Court's own jurisprudence in cabining federal power in areas
[T]here must be an agreement, a bona fide agreement, between states, not a "mock
marriage." So, hypothetically, if in order to circumvent the House of Representatives and the states, the President wrote a uniform divorce law, applicable to the
United States alone, into 'a treaty', and the Prime Minister of Canada cooperated in
the Scheme ... it would presumably not be a treaty under international law, and
therefore not a treaty under the Constitution.
Id.
377.
See Statements of James Wilson, supra note 248, at 508 (stating that any fears related to the Senate bribing the House are not an objection to the system of government
proposed but a commentary on human nature).
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where Congress is otherwise competent to legislate. "If there is one lesson most believed that the Court had learned during the New Deal, it is
that greater danger may lie in the rejection of democratic ends than in a
system of imperfect boundaries between federal and state spheres. '37 '
Professor Bradley's initial premise for arguing that there indeed exist
federalism limitations to the foreign affairs power is that ours is a government of limited and enumerated powers, and thus "when the federal
government makes supreme federal law, it is restrained in what it can do
either by inherent limits in the scope of its delegated powers, or by the
Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the states, or both."379 The
essence of Professor Bradley's argument is "that if federalism is to be the
subject of judicial protection . . . there is no justification for giving the

treaty power special immunity from such protection."3 ° But why not?
The argument seems to be that if the Court is to remain consistent with
its first principle federalism doctrine, then it must extend implied federalism limitations to all areas of congressional and executive power. But
this argument for consistency or symmetry is not an argument based on
what is constitutionally permissible, only what may be doctrinally desirable or normatively preferred.
It is not unprecedented for Congress to be able to legislate pursuant
to one of its powers, but not pursuant to others. As Professor Vdzquez
explains, "In no other context are the limits of one power applicable to
another power."38 ' There is no recognizable doctrine that applies the limitations to the Bankruptcy Power, for example, to the power to raise
armies, or to the power to coin money.38238In United States v. Butler,383 for
example, the Supreme Court interpreted Congress's power to tax and
that to regulate interstate commerce as mutually independent.384 Similarly, the argument for symmetry does not make the case that federalism
limitations ought to apply to the treaty power.
The first historical evidence on which Professor Bradley relies to advance the federalism limitations argument is that at the time of the
founding there was a clear understanding about what was truly interna-

378.
Nourse, supra note 152, at 23.
379.
FederalismI, supra note 17, at 392 (citing for this proposition, New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 155-56 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991);
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2379 (1997); and South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505, 511 n.5 (1988)).
380.
FederalismI, supra note 17, at 394.
381.
Vdzquez, supra note 26, at 720.
382.
See id.
383.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
384.
Id. at 65-66.
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tional-the proper subject of treaties-and what was domestic." 5 But
this statement by itself adds no instructive insights. Rather, it speaks to
the "proper" subject of treaties, which is quite different in the year 2004
than it was in 1791. That is to say, it is unhelpful to determine whether
there is or ought to be a federalism limitation to the treaty power by stating that the Framers understood it to encompass only international
matters. For if a matter is deemed to be international, then on Professor
Bradley's own terms, no federalism limitation should apply.
Professor Bradley also critiques the separation of subject matter
from federalism concerns as artificial because, the argument goes, it is
precisely by combining them that the problem of preemptive implementing federal law arises.386 It is unclear, however, why the combination of
subject matter as understood in 1791 and first principles federalism
should define the scope of the treaty power. It is no less artificial to cut
the Rehnquist Court's brand of federalism, on which these recent claims
are made, and paste them onto the intent of the Framers, and further infer from that combination the proposition that the Constitution demands
a state rights' limitation on the exercise of the treaty power. One could,
as a theoretical matter, make a principled objection to an unlimited treaty
power. But no one argues that the power is unlimited, only that it is limited by the institutional safeguards of the treaty-making process itself
and the explicit prohibitions of the Constitution. That those may be conceived by some to be insufficient limitations does not render the power
limitless. Nor does the fact that it is limited in some way mean that it is
sufficiently limited. But what the limit should be cannot be found in the
federalism doctrine.
It is unnecessary to foresee a clash of values between federalism and
the treaty power. The inherent nature of foreign policy sovereignty can
be understood in the same structural terms that the Court has ascribed to
state sovereignty in recent years: the power to conduct foreign affairs at
the national level and the implementation of a treaty is the conduct of
foreign affairs; it is a statement about the United States' commitment to
the instrument it ratified. It is both plenary and exclusive and arises "inherently" from the "conception of nationality."3 7
Just as the structure of government is preserved by ensuring appropriate limits between that which the government can regulate at the
national level and that which it cannot because it falls within the prerogative of a state, the national structure is preserved by understanding
that the treaty power does not, and it need not incorporate states' rights
385.
386.
387.

See FederalismI, supra note 17, at 410-11.
See FederalismH, supra note 17, at 104-O5.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-18 (1936).
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considerations. Due consideration was given to state interests by putting
in place the procedural and structural safeguards the Framers agreed
upon. To "split" the "atom of sovereignty" in the area of foreign affairs is
to deny the very essence of what it means to be a nation as envisioned by
Madison.
Accommodation of competing values is preferable to confrontation.
Accommodation incorporates interpretive integrity and expands the possibilities of republican government. This statement of course, assumes
that the role of the Court is to expand the possibilities of government. By
this I mean that it is the duty of the Court to remain faithful to the Constitution, but at the same time to interpret the document in a way that
does not create irreconcilable or irretrievable fissures in our constitutional understandings. A declaration that the Constitution forbids the
democratically elected branches from carrying out the nation's international obligations in a manner, which in their judgment, fully
accomplishes those objectives, is problematic when such a declaration is
premised on an ambiguous account of historical originalism. Rather, the
procedural safeguards understanding of the treaty power is historically
supported, and is nowhere contradicted by text, history, or settled doctrinal understandings. To preserve the country's original design by
fragmenting the treaty power, as is the purported goal of the current conservative majority of the Court, is to neglect this country's current
design.
Founding era conceptions of our structure bear on contemporary issues and permissible interpretations only as a starting point, but they
cannot be the definitive and ending point. The rich doctrinal constitutional history and evolved understanding of the role of international
commitments ought to bear on our current understanding of the treaty
power, for they themselves incorporate evolving conceptions of what is
permissible and acceptable in constitutional practice and political compromise. Evolving doctrinal understandings reflect our commitments to
constitutional stability.
Tolerance for implementing legislation that may contradict this
Court's federalism aspirations or structural visions simply follows from
the Supremacy Clause and from a vision of a strong executive in the foreign policy realm. The thought of federalism limitations in domestic
legislation may be said to follow from an anti-tyranny principle coupled
with a structural appreciation for how command and control vitiates
checks and balances. It may be necessary for Article I powers, although
not necessarily in the categorical manner in which the Court has deployed it. But with respect to the treaty power, the structural safeguards
were explicitly factored in, not just because each state is equally repre-
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sented in the Senate, but also because steps necessary to trigger the
treaty power involve a complex series of negotiations, agreements,
counter proposals, political compromises, and the agreement of other
nations as well as two-thirds of the Senate.388 These international and
national structural safeguards were deemed adequate enough even for
the most ardent opponents of the Constitution.
Doctrinally, at least, an acceptance of a federalism limitation to the
Treaty Power would require explicitly overruling McCulloch vs. Maryland, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) and its interpretation
of what is "necessary and proper" as well as Missouri v. Holland, Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), (which some advocate as a
necessary result). Proponents of this new framework should advance
more than categorical arguments, permitted only by recent doctrinal developments, themselves of questionable constitutional validity, that what
they have offered.
Categorical statements about federalism limitations seem oblivious
to difficulties of applying such limitations in practice. For example, even
if one were to accept that the Rehnquist Court's brand of federalism requires a re-examination of previously settled understandings, it is
unclear what kind of limits treaty-makers ought to be concerned about
when negotiating with foreign nations if the agreement is to be selfexecuting, or what state sovereign prerogatives ought to trump implementing legislation. The more important implication, however, is what
effect this analytical approach would have on the foreign affairs power
and the Court's involvement in parsing through the legitimacy or illegitimacy of these agreements on federalism grounds.
CONCLUSION

This Article has explored the idea that treaty-implementing legislation, unencumbered by federalism limitations, is consistent with the
Constitution. The Civil Remedy Provision of the VAWA could have been
a legitimate domestication of a human rights norm to which this country
has acceded. It seems improbable that the elected branches would collude with the objective of subverting state prerogatives. Indeed, the
Senate's adoption of federalism understandings, for example, reflects the
due consideration and responsible decision-making in which the Senate
engages in matters of foreign policy. Structural safeguards have worked
for 200 years, and there is no reason to think that they have become an
insufficient limitation.
388.

See supra Part II, pp. 309-25.
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I believe that the Holland caveat cannot be answered authoritatively
or conclusively. The nature of federalism discourse, with its normatively
loaded terms of "natures," "essences," "traditional state prerogatives,"
and constitutional silences, are notoriously difficult tools in a doctrinal
toolbox. 9 It is not constitutionally inevitable that federalism limitations
ought to hinder the treaty power generally or implementing legislation
specifically, any more than the first principle federalism decisions were
themselves constitutionally inevitable.
The complexity of these issues arises at a time when the internationalization of norms is pervasive at all levels of regulation, while the trend
domestically is to contract the legislative power and to shield state interests from federal encroachment. But a limitation to the treaty power is
not a unitary or isolated consideration. It is informed by allocations of
power and structural concerns that are distinct from those related to Article I powers. Any consideration of the treaty power scope ought to take
into account the nature of the international obligations assumed pursuant
to it. The discussion ultimately addresses the treaty-makers' constitutional prerogative to exercise the treaty power in a manner that is
consistent both with federalism concerns and with international norms.
Their ability to do so is tempered by the structural assurances and doctrinal understandings that have preserved this power since the creation of
the Republic.
A serious consideration of this Country's assumed obligations under
the Covenant should help advance a broader understanding of the implications of a treaty power restrained by neo-federalism limits. Should
Congress choose to implement discreet provisions of human rights treaties, it should be able to do so unimpeded by structural concerns that
have no bearing on the nature of the matters embraced by the treaty
power. The structural concerns relating to state interests that arise today,
were authoritatively resolved at the creation of the republic.

389.
See Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in a Post-Printz World, 36
L.J. 11, 35-37 (2000).
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APPENDIX

UNITED STATES RESERVATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS,

AND

DECLARATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND

POLITICAL RIGHTS

1. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
reservations:
(1) That Article 20 [free speech] does not authorize or require
legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
(2) That the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any
person (other than a pregnant women) duly convicted under
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital
punishment, including such punishment for crimes committed
by persons below eighteen years of age.
(3) That the United States considers itself bound by Article 7
[torture/punishment] to the extent that "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth,
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of
the United States.
(4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the
penalty in force at the time the offense was committed, the
United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph
1 of Article 15 [post-offense reductions in penalty].
(5) That the policy and practice of the United States are generally
in compliance with and supportive of the Covenant's provisions regarding treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice
system. Nevertheless, the United States reserves the right, in
exceptional circumstances, to treat juveniles as adults, notwithstanding paragraphs 2(b) and 3 of Article 10 [treatment of
juveniles in the criminal justice system] and paragraph 4 of
Article 14 [trial procedure in the criminal justice system]. The
United States further reserves to these provisions with respect
to individuals who volunteer for military service prior to age
18.
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II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
understandings, which shall apply to the obligations of the
United States under this Covenant:
(1) That the Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee
all persons equal protection of the law and provide extensive
protections against discrimination. The United States understands distinctions based upon race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or any other status-as those terms are used in
Article 2, paragraph 1 [nondiscrimination] and Article 26
[nondiscrimination]-to be permitted when such distinctions
are, at minimum, rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. The United States further understands the
prohibition in paragraph 1 of Article 4 [nondiscrimination]
upon discrimination, in time of public emergency, based
"solely" on the status of race, color, sex, language, religion or
social origin not to bar distinctions that may have a disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.
(2) That the United States understands the right to compensation
referred to in Articles 9(5) and 14(6) [compensation for
unlawful arrest and miscarriage of justice] to require the provision of effective and enforceable mechanisms by which a
victim of an unlawful arrest or detention or a miscarriage of
justice may seek and, where justified, obtain compensation
from either the responsible individual or the appropriate governmental entity. Entitlement to compensation may be subject
to the reasonable requirements of domestic law.
(3) That the Untied states understands the reference to "exceptional circumstances" in paragraph 2(a) of Article 10
[separate treatment of the accused] to permit the imprisonment of an accused person with convicted persons where
appropriate in light of an individual's overall dangerousness,
and to permit accused persons to waive their right to segregation from convicted persons. The United States further
understands that paragraph 3 of Article 10 [separate treatment
of the accused] does not diminish the goals of punishment,
deterrence, and incapacitation as additional legitimate purposes for a penitentiary system.
(4) That the United States understands that subparagraphs 3(b)
and (d) of Article 14 [right to counsel] do not require the
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provision of a criminal defendant's counsel of choice when
the defendant is provided with court-appointed counsel on
grounds of indigence, when the defendant is financially able
to retain alternative counsel, or when imprisonment is no imposed. The United States further understands that paragraph
3(e) [compelled witness] does not prohibit a requirement that
the defendant make a showing that any witness whose attendance he seeks to compel is necessary for his defense. The
United States understands the prohibition upon double jeopardy in paragraph 7 [double jeopardy] to apply only when the
judgment of acquittal has been rendered by a court of the
same governmental unit, whether the Federal Government or
a constituent unit, as is seeking a new trial for the same cause.
(5) That the United States understands [in regard to Article 50
(federalism)] that this Covenant shall be implemented by the
Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative
and judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and
otherwise by the state and local governments; to the extent
that state and local governments exercise jurisdiction over
such matters, the Federal Government shall take measures
appropriate to the Federal System to the end that the competent authorities of the state or local governments may take
appropriate measures for the fulfillment of the Covenant.
1II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
declarations:
(1) That the United States declares that the provisions of Articles
1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.
(2) That it is the view of the United States [in regard to restrictions on rights] that states Party to the Covenant should
wherever possible refrain from imposing any restrictions or
limitations on the exercise of the rights recognized and protected by the Covenant, even when such restrictions and
limitations are permissible under the terms of the Covenant.
For the United States, Article 5, paragraph 2, which provides
that fundamental human rights existing in any state Party may
not be diminished on the pretext that the Covenant recognizes
them to a lesser extent, has particular relevance to Article 19,
paragraph 3, which would permit certain restrictions on the
freedom of expression. The United States declares that it will
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continue to adhere to the requirements and constraints of its
Constitution in respect to all such restrictions and limitations.
(3) That the United States declares that it accepts the competence
of the Human Rights Committee to receive and consider
communications under Article 41 [state-to-state complaints]
in which a state Party claims that another state party is not
fulfilling its obligations under the Covenant.
(4) That the United States declares that the right referred to in Article 47 [savings clause on natural wealth and resources] may
be exercised only in accordance with international law.
IV. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following
proviso, which shall not be included in the instrument of ratification to be deposited by the President:
Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or
other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the
Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United
States.39

390.
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